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1STATE ACTION AND THE CONSTITUTION’S 
MIDDLE BAND
Louis Michael Seidman*
On conventional accounts, the state action doctrine is dichotomous. When 
the government acts, constitutional limits take hold and the government ac-
tion is invalid if those limits are exceeded. When the government fails to act, 
the state action doctrine leaves decisions to individuals, who are permitted to 
violate what would otherwise be constitutional constraints.
It turns out though that the modern state action doctrine creates three rather 
than two domains. There is indeed a private, inner band where there is 
thought to be insufficient government action to trigger constitutional con-
straints, but often there is also a public, outer band where there is too much 
state action for the Constitution to apply. The Constitution takes hold only in 
a middle band—the Goldilocks band—sandwiched between these two do-
mains. For constitutional limitations to have force, the government must act 
just enough—but not too much.
This Article’s first aim is to identify and describe this puzzling structure. It al-
so examines a variety of doctrinal principles that produce and, perhaps, justi-
fy the state action doctrine’s three bands. The Article then argues that these 
seemingly disparate principles are all related to the special constitutional 
problems produced by the emergence of the middle band of government regu-
lation. Finally, the Article concludes with some brief speculation about 
whether the modern tripartite structure can survive.
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Introduction
According to conventional accounts, the state action doctrine is dichot-
omous. When the government acts, constitutional limits take hold and the 
government action is invalid if those limits are exceeded. When the govern-
ment fails to act, the state action doctrine leaves decisions to individuals, 
who are permitted to violate what would otherwise be constitutional con-
straints.1 These accounts are linked to the conventional view about the pri-
mary purpose served by constitutional law. On this view, the Constitution’s 
main function is to limit government power in order to protect individual 
freedom. As Robert McCloskey once wrote: “[T]he essential business of the 
Supreme Court is to say ‘no’ to government.”2
The state action doctrine serves this purpose by providing constitutional 
protections where they are needed most. The doctrine prevents judicial en-
1. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, The Public/Private Distinction and Constitutional Limits 
on Private Power, 10 Const. Comment. 361, 362 (1993) (“The Supreme Court has said on 
numerous occasions that key constitutional provisions . . . apply only to ‘state action’ and not 
to private action.”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. L. Rev. 503, 507 
(1985) (“It is firmly established that the Constitution applies only to governmental conduct.”).
2. Robert G. McCloskey, Introduction to Essays in Constitutional Law 5, 6 (Robert 
G. McCloskey ed., 1957); see also, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Core of an Uneasy Case for 
Judicial Review, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 1693, 1707 (2008) (“The underlying premise [of the Consti-
tution], plainly, is that it is presumptively worse for legislation to be enacted than not enacted, 
largely because of the threat that legislation might violate individual rights, and that multiple 
veto points should therefore exist.”).
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forcement of the Constitution from itself serving as an excuse for govern-
ment intervention.3 As Justice Byron White argued,
Careful adherence to the “state action” requirement preserves an area of 
individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and federal judicial 
power. . . . A major consequence is to require the courts to respect the lim-
its of their own power as directed against state governments and private in-
terests.4
In short, the state action doctrine embodies the principle that government 
action—rather than action taken by private individuals—triggers constitu-
tional limitations.
Many critics of the state action doctrine have attacked its coherence and 
normative attractiveness.5 They have disputed the connection between the 
doctrine and individual freedom by pointing out that the absence of consti-
tutional protections in effect authorizes private coercion.6 Moreover, they 
insist that the government is always implicated in that coercion. In particu-
lar, they assert that the state action doctrine systematically ignores back-
ground, structural state action like common law tort, property, and contract 
rules that shape, limit, and legitimate private conduct.7 That observation, in 
turn, has led some commentators to conclude that there is no real “state ac-
tion” doctrine. Instead of asking whether there is “state action,” these com-
mentators argue that courts should focus on the state conduct that is always 
3. As an illustration of the second function, imagine that the Free Press Clause was not 
subject to a state action requirement. In the absence of the requirement, the government would 
be required to tell newspapers what to publish so as to prevent them from “suppressing”
speech that newspaper publishers disagreed with. Cf. Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 
U.S. 241 (1974) (invalidating “right of reply” law as violative of First Amendment principles).
4. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936–37 (1982); see also, e.g., William 
Baude & James Y. Stern, The Positive Law Model of the Fourth Amendment, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 
1821, 1845 (2016) (noting that “[t]he basic premise of our constitutional order is that govern-
ment presents special dangers” and that “[f]or this reason, the Constitution imposes numerous 
restrictions on actions by government that it does not impose on private actors, a principle 
reflected in the so-called state action doctrine”); Frank I. Michelman, W(h)ither the Constitu-
tion?, 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 1063, 1076–77 (2000) (associating the state action doctrine with a 
theory focused on the fact that “the state’s monopoly of lawful force, its unique powers of law-
ful, direct coercion of persons, make it (most definitely) a power-source to be feared”).
5. For representative examples, see Charles L. Black, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1966 
Term—Foreword: “State Action,” Equal Protection, and California’s Proposition 14, 81 Harv. L. 
Rev. 69 (1967); Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg Brothers v. 
Brooks, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1296 (1982); Chemerinsky, supra note 1; Duncan Kennedy, The 
Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1349 (1982). For an 
unusual and insightful defense of the doctrine against its critics, see Lillian BeVier & John Har-
rison, The State Action Principle and Its Critics, 96 Va. L. Rev. 1767 (2010).
6. The argument has its origins in Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Sup-
posedly Non-Coercive State, 38 Pol. Sci. Q. 470 (1923). For a modern articulation, see, for ex-
ample, Chemerinsky, supra note 1.
7. See, e.g., Louis Michael Seidman & Mark V. Tushnet, Remnants of Belief: 
Contemporary Constitutional Issues 66–67 (1996).
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present and determine whether that conduct violates substantive constitu-
tional norms.8
After several generations of contestation, these positions are now well 
understood. The argument has gone stale. Remarkably, though, no one has 
noticed that both sides misstate the fundamental structure of state action 
law.
The state action doctrine is not dichotomous at all. It has a tripartite 
structure that delineates three, rather than two, domains. First, there is a pri-
vate, inner band where there is insufficient government action to trigger 
constitutional constraints. Second, there is a public, outer band where there 
is too much state action for the Constitution to apply. Third, there is a mid-
dle band—a Goldilocks band—where the level of government action is just 
right, and the Constitution takes hold. For constitutional limitations to have 
force, the government must act just enough—but not too much.
Two recent Supreme Court cases illustrate this basic structure. First, in 
Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc.,9 the Sons of 
Confederate Veterans, Texas Division sought an injunction requiring the 
state to provide specialty license plates featuring a Confederate battle flag. 
The license plates were similar to other plates that the state had issued and 
that supported controversial causes, but state officials denied this request.10
The organization sued, claiming that the denial constituted content discrim-
ination that violated the free speech guarantee of the First Amendment.11
Writing for the Court, Justice Breyer detailed the extensive history of 
state involvement in the design and issuance of license plates.12 Texas plate 
designs were “often closely identified in the public mind with the [state].”13
As a legal matter, Texas owned the designs.14 The state “maintain[ed] direct 
control over the messages conveyed on its specialty plates.”15
Consideration of factors like these is standard fare in state action cases, 
the outcome of which often rests on “the peculiar facts or circumstances pre-
sent.”16 A history of state involvement,17 public identification of the activity 
8. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 1; Robert J. Glennon, Jr. & John E. Nowak, A Func-
tional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment “State Action” Requirement, 1976 Sup. Ct. Rev. 
221; Harold W. Horowitz, The Misleading Search for “State Action” Under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 30 S. Cal. L. Rev. 208 (1957).
9. 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015).
10. See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2248; id. at 2257 (Alito, J., dissenting).
11. Id. at 2245 (majority opinion).
12. Id. at 2248.
13. Id. (quoting Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 472 (2009)).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 2249.
16. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 726 (1961) (plurality opinion).
17. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301 (1966) (noting that “[f]or years [a segregated 
park] was an integral part of the City of Macon’s activities” and that “[t]he momentum it ac-
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with the state,18 and state ownership19 and control20 are all factors that the 
Court has used to indicate the presence of enough state action to invoke con-
stitutional scrutiny. For example, in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authori-
ty, the Court relied on facts like these to hold that the state was implicated in 
the discriminatory conduct of a private restaurant leasing space in a public 
garage.21
Remarkably, though, the Walker Court thought that these factors cut the 
other way. Instead of demonstrating the extensive state involvement that 
triggered constitutional protections, these factors demonstrated that the in-
volvement was too extensive, thereby entitling the state to constitutional im-
munity.22 Taken together, the factors showed that the design on license 
plates was “government speech,” which, in the Court’s view, was checked by 
“the democratic electoral process” rather than by the Constitution.23 Because 
state involvement was so pervasive, the Free Speech Clause lost its force. If 
the government had been less involved in license plate design and messag-
ing, the speech might have been private and the Sons of Confederate Veter-
ans might have had a constitutional right to the plate they desired.24
The point is driven home by comparing Walker with Matal v. Tam.25 In 
Matal, the respondent argued that a section of the Lanham Act that prohib-
ited the registration of trademarks that “disparage . . . or bring . . . into con-
temp[t] or disrepute” any “persons, living or dead” violated the Free Speech 
Clause.26 The Court distinguished Walker and held that registration did not 
constitute government speech.27 The Court reached this conclusion because:
quired as a public facility is certainly not dissipated ipso facto by the appointment of ‘private’
trustees”).
18. See Burton, 365 U.S. at 720 (plurality opinion) (noting that building in which dis-
crimination occurred was marked by “official signs indicating the public character of the build-
ing” and that state and national flags flew over it); cf. Evans, 382 U.S. at 302 (holding that dis-
criminatory policy of privately run park was state action in part because park had previously 
been controlled by the city and had a “public character”).
19. See Burton, 365 U.S. at 723 (plurality opinion) (attributing racial discrimination of a 
private restaurant to the state in part because “[t]he land and building were publicly owned”).
20. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 841 (1982) (holding that private school’s
putative free speech violations were not attributable to the state in part because the actions 
“were not compelled or even influenced by any state regulation”).
21. Burton, 365 U.S. 715 (plurality opinion).
22. Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2250 
(2015).
23. Id. at 2245.
24. Of course, the Walker Court did not use the phrase “state action.” It may, therefore 
seem odd to think of the case as involving state action principles. I address this objection infra
in Part III.
25. 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017) (plurality opinion in part).
26. Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1751 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012)).
27. Id. at 1760.
6 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 117:1
The Federal Government does not dream up these marks, and it does not 
edit marks submitted for registration. Except as required by the statute in-
volved here . . . an examiner may not reject a mark based on the viewpoint 
that it appears to express. Thus, unless that section is thought to apply, an 
examiner does not inquire whether any viewpoint conveyed by a mark is 
consistent with Government policy or whether any such viewpoint is con-
sistent with that expressed by other marks already on the principal regis-
ter.28
Because the government’s involvement was not sufficient to trigger the gov-
ernment speech doctrine, the First Amendment took hold and made the 
statute invalid. If the government had asserted more control over the marks, 
by “dream[ing] [them] up,” editing them, or “reject[ing] [them] based on the 
viewpoint that [they appear] to express,”29 they might have counted as gov-
ernment speech, and the statute would have been less vulnerable to constitu-
tional attack.
A similar dynamic is at work in a much more famous dispute involving 
the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act (ACA).30 In National Feder-
ation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, the plaintiffs successfully argued 
that the ACA’s “individual mandate,” requiring certain individuals to pur-
chase insurance, exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause powers.31 Their ar-
gument rested on the common sense notion that the “commerce” referred to 
in Article I does not include the failure to engage in commerce by refusing to 
purchase insurance.32 As Chief Justice Roberts put it, “The power to regulate
commerce presupposes the existence of commercial activity to be regulat-
ed. . . . The language of the Constitution reflects the natural understanding 
that the power to regulate assumes there is already something to be regulat-
ed.”33
There is much to be said for and against this argument,34 and most of it 
has already been said. Still, commentators have not paid adequate attention 
to a paradox at the core of the Court’s opinion.35 Suppose that instead of re-
28. Id. at 1758.
29. See id.
30. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 18, 20, 21, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 35, 36 & 
42 U.S.C.).
31. 567 U.S. 519, 558 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
32. See Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 555 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
33. Id. at 550 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
34. Compare id., with id. at 610 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the 
judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (“This argument is difficult to fathom. Requiring in-
dividuals to obtain insurance unquestionably regulates the interstate health-insurance and 
health-care markets, both of them in existence well before the enactment of the ACA.”).
35. But see id. at 589 (Ginsburg, J. concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in 
part, and dissenting in part) (“In the Social Security Act, Congress installed a federal system to 
provide monthly benefits to retired wage earners and, eventually, to their survivors. Beyond 
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quiring individuals to purchase private insurance, the government had es-
tablished a government-run “single payer” system analogous to the Social 
Security System or Medicare and that individuals were required to pay for 
the insurance provided by that system. A program like this would involve 
much more extensive government intervention into health markets. In fact, 
for just that reason, the Obama administration elected not to push for it.36
Yet this greater government involvement would have shielded the program 
from the constitutional attack that was successful in Sebelius. The constitu-
tionality of forced involvement in government-run-and-mandated insurance 
programs like Social Security has been uncontroversial for almost a centu-
ry,37 and no one has suggested that the holding in Sebelius changes that un-
derstanding.
Conversely, suppose that the government “privatized” Social Security in 
a manner analogous to the program George W. Bush proposed in 2005.38 If 
individuals were obligated to invest in private equities instead of paying a so-
cial security tax, the program would be vulnerable to challenge under Sebe-
lius.39 This program, like the ACA, would require individuals to purchase in 
private markets a product that they did not want. “Privatization” would 
move Social Security from the outer to the middle band—making it more, 
rather than less, vulnerable to constitutional challenge. That is because the 
government would be less involved with Social Security than it is currently 
and the level of government action would be just right to trigger constitu-
tional scrutiny.
Sebelius, then, provides another illustration of the tripartite structure of 
state action. If government does too little, constitutional limits lose their 
force. A private employer who requires employees to purchase insurance 
faces no constitutional obstacles even if the government ultimately stands 
ready to enforce employment contracts. But if the government does too 
much—if it runs the program itself rather than relying on private insurance 
markets—then constitutional constraints again lose their force.40 Even 
question, Congress could have adopted a similar scheme for healthcare. Congress chose, in-
stead, to preserve a central role for private insurers and state governments.”).
36. See Text: Obama’s Speech on Health Care Reform, N.Y. Times (June 15, 2009), http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/06/15/health/policy/15obama.text.html (on file with the Michigan 
Law Review) (“There are countries where a single-payer system may be working. But . . . it is 
important for us to build on our traditions here in the United States. So, when you hear the 
naysayers claim that I’m trying to bring about government-run health care, know this—they 
are not telling the truth.”).
37. See Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (upholding federal unemploy-
ment compensation provisions of the Social Security Act).
38. See Text of President Bush’s 2005 State of the Union Address, Wash. Post (Feb. 2, 
2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/transcripts/bushtext_020205.html
[https://perma.cc/3R66-GLHS].
39. The hypothetical program is only analogous to the Bush proposal because the actual 
proposal provided for voluntary accounts. See id.
40. Cf. Steward Mach., 301 U.S. 548 (upholding constitutionality of a federal tax to fund 
unemployment compensation system).
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though the individual is similarly coerced, the government’s deeper in-
volvement vitiates constitutional protections. It is only when the government 
operates in the middle band—when it intervenes in the private sphere with-
out altogether displacing it—that constitutional restrictions apply.
The results in Walker and Sebelius may seem anomalous, but the deci-
sions themselves are not anomalies. As I detail below, the same structure ap-
plies across a broad range of constitutional doctrine.41 Of course, the Court 
never characterizes the outer “too much government” band as implicating 
the “state action doctrine.” For example, as a strictly formal matter, the con-
trasting results under Sebelius and under a hypothetical “single payer” 
scheme are produced not by the presence or absence of state action but by 
reliance on different heads of congressional power that bring with them dif-
ferent doctrinal baggage.42
Readers obsessed with doctrinal categories or with constitutional law 
casebook chapter headings may therefore be confused when I assert that this 
article is about “state action.” It is emphatically not about “state action” as 
the Supreme Court has used the term. The Court never uses the words “state 
action” when it upholds government conduct because it is in the outer band. 
Moreover, when the Court finds that there is “no state action,” it holds that 
the Constitution does not apply. For example, if a private employer forces his 
employees to purchase health insurance, the Constitution has nothing to say 
about the matter. In contrast, when the Court finds that there is too much 
state action, it holds that the Constitution applies but is not violated. For ex-
ample, if the federal government took over healthcare markets, no one 
would claim that the Constitution was inapplicable. Instead, the case would 
be conceptualized as one where applicable constitutional provisions were 
satisfied.
But we should not allow these distinctions to distract us from the central 
point. When I use the term “state action” in this Article, I mean to focus on 
the way the doctrine actually cashes out, not on the labels that the Court has 
used to describe the doctrine. Perhaps there is a conceptual distinction be-
tween violation and nonapplication,43 but the distinction usually makes no 
difference in how cases are actually decided. My argument is about how cas-
41. See infra Part II.
42. The Court upheld both the ACA and the Social Security Act under Congress’s art. I, 
§ 8, cl. 1 authority to tax and spend for the general welfare. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. 
Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 563–71 (2012); Steward Mach., 301 U.S. at 586–87. A majority of the 
Court held that Congress’s art. I, § 8, cl. 3 power to regulate commerce among the states and 
art. I, § 8, cl. 18 “necessary and proper” power did not justify the ACA. See Sebelius at 547–61
(opinion of Roberts, C.J.); id. at 649–62 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
43. See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Ex-
ploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1765, 1769 (2004) (“All rules—legal or 
otherwise—apply only to some facts and only under some circumstances. Even before we see 
what a rule does, we must make the initial determination of whether it applies at all—whether 
we are within its scope of operation.”).
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es are actually decided.44 It is about broader, mostly unrecognized, concerns 
that cross doctrinal boundaries. It would be wrong to ignore the technical 
niceties of doctrine,45 but it is also a mistake to overemphasize them. How-
ever individual doctrines are defined or justified, the fact remains that con-
stitutional protections often fail to take hold (either because the Constitution 
does not apply or because it is not violated) in both the outer and inner 
bands that surround the middle domain of constitutional protection.
This structure, in turn, raises fundamental issues about conventional ar-
guments for the state action doctrine and about constitutional law more 
generally. If the state action doctrine is designed to “preserve[] an area of in-
dividual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law,”46 as Justice White as-
serted, then how can it be that when the government acts more aggressively 
the Constitution constrains it less? If “the essential business of the Supreme 
Court is to say ‘no’ to government,”47 as Robert McCloskey asserted, then 
why does the Supreme Court often change its answer from “no” to “yes” 
when the government does more? State action’s unnoticed tripartite struc-
ture therefore suggests that something is seriously wrong with the conven-
tional account.
The first aim of this Article is to identify and describe this puzzling 
structure. That is the business of Parts I and II. Part I sets out the conven-
tional dichotomous view of state action, and Part II complicates that view 
with many other examples, like Walker and Sebelius, where the law of state 
action has a tripartite structure. Part I argues that that the conventional view 
anachronistically assumes that there are only two spheres: a public sphere of 
police power and a private sphere of individual freedom. In fact, since the 
New Deal, there has also been a middle band that is neither fully public nor 
fully private but, instead, is the home for government regulation. The consti-
tutional action takes place in this middle band.
This basic structure produces many outcomes that seem paradoxical 
when viewed through the lens of pre–New Deal constitutionalism: in a sur-
prisingly large number of cases, the government is less constitutionally con-
strained when it acts more aggressively. Part II provides examples of this 
phenomenon. I hope to provide enough examples drawn from diverse areas 
of constitutional doctrine to convince readers that something important and 
counterintuitive is going on.
What accounts for this structure? A natural reaction to the examples de-
tailed below is to disaggregate and normalize them. A critical reader might 
argue that the examples have nothing to do with a reconceptualization of 
44. Cf. Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 Colum. L. 
Rev. 857, 858 (1999) (attacking view that “judges and scholars should always be careful to dis-
tinguish the true constitutional right from judicial application of the right in the course of con-
stitutional adjudication”).
45. I discuss some of them infra in Section III.A.
46. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982).
47. McCloskey, supra note 2, at 6.
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state action and that there is no deep structure that explains them. Instead, 
they demonstrate only that different constitutional provisions or different 
doctrinal principles produce different results.
I take this objection seriously and pursue it in Part III, which examines a 
variety of doctrinal principles that produce and, perhaps, justify these results. 
Even if doctrinal principles were the whole story, we learn something signifi-
cant from thinking about these principles against the general backdrop of 
tripartite state action. It turns out that the concern about government over-
reach often takes a back seat to other concerns that leave the government less 
constrained when it acts more aggressively.
But formal doctrinal principles are not the whole story. Part IV argues 
that these seemingly disparate doctrinal principles are all related in whole or 
in part to the special constitutional problems produced by the emergence of 
the middle band of government regulation. Before the New Deal revolution, 
standard constitutional theory identified a public zone of police power and a 
private zone of individual freedom. Constitutional limits were thought to 
protect against expansion of the police power into the private sphere. The 
New Deal revolution legitimated that expansion. A sphere of more or less 
untrammeled public power and a sphere of more or less autonomous private 
freedom remained, but a middle, mixed sphere of government regulation 
emerged. Much of modern constitutional law consists of doctrines designed 
to remedy pathologies associated with the middle sphere.
The Article concludes with some brief speculation about whether the 
modern tripartite structure can survive. Contemporary approaches to consti-
tutional law leave the boundaries between the bands porous and undefend-
ed. Our messy, atheoretical compromise has been good enough for periods 
of consensus and prosperity, but it is anyone’s guess whether the structure is 
strong enough to withstand the coming assault.
Two final words of clarification are in order. First, I make no claim that 
this tripartite structure explains all the mysteries of American constitutional-
ism. Constitutional law is an immensely complicated social phenomenon. I 
describe no more than one view of the cathedral.48 Second, what follows is 
only descriptive. I do not attempt to defend these structures and do not ar-
gue that they are coherent or free from contradiction. As Oliver Wendell 
Holmes famously claimed:
When you get the dragon out of his cave on to the plain and in the daylight, 
you can count his teeth and claws, and see just what is his strength. But to 
get him out is only the first step. The next is either to kill him, or to tame 
him and make him a useful animal.49
48. Cf. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and In-
alienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972).
49. O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 469 (1897).
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This Article counts some of the teeth and some of the claws. The killing or 
taming will have to await another day.
I.  The Conventional Doctrine and Its Problems
Surprisingly, both the modern state action doctrine and its difficulties 
are a direct consequence of the New Deal revolution in constitutional juris-
prudence. This Part outlines the difficulties and then traces their origins to 
the disruptions produced by New Deal constitutionalism.
A. The Implausibility of the Conventional Approach
Sometimes the modern Court pretends that the state action requirement 
can be read directly off the Constitution’s text and the original public mean-
ing of that text. A typical statement of this view appears in Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court in DeShaney v. Winnebago County De-
partment of Social Services,50 where the Court held that the Constitution did 
not reach the failure of state welfare officials to prevent a parent from seri-
ously harming his child:
[N]othing in the language of the Due Process Clause . . . requires the State 
to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by 
private actors. The Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State’s power to 
act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security. It 
forbids the State itself to deprive individuals of life, liberty, or property 
without “due process of law,” but its language cannot fairly be extended to 
impose an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that those interests 
do not come to harm through other means.51
This purely textual argument does not withstand analysis. First, there is 
the obvious, if embarrassing, fact that the Fifth Amendment Due Process 
Clause, unlike its Fourteenth Amendment counterpart, uses the passive 
voice and does not textually limit the subjects controlled by its commands.52
Yet neither Chief Justice Rehnquist nor any of his colleagues ever suggested 
that the Fifth Amendment, unlike the Fourteenth, applies to private actors.
Moreover, a straightforward reading of the Fourteenth Amendment 
would extend its reach to government failure to control private conduct. The 
text prohibits the state from “depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law.”53 If DeShaney’s allegations were correct, 
then the state’s failure to intervene was a but-for cause of the child’s injury. 
Saying that a failure to act that causes an injury “deprives” an individual of 
50. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
51. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195.
52. Compare U.S. Const. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law . . . .”), with id. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State 
deprive a person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”).
53. Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
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something she would otherwise have is fully consistent with the ordinary 
English usage. For example, a competent speaker of English might say that 
“Jim’s failure to fill out his application on time deprived him of a chance to 
get the job.”
Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist came close to acknowledging this fact. 
In a footnote, he conceded that “[t]he State may not, of course, selectively 
deny its protective services to certain disfavored minorities without violating 
the Equal Protection Clause.”54 But if the state’s failure to protect against 
private violence can “deny” equal protection, why can’t the same failure “de-
prive” individuals of liberty? At least in this context, “deny” and “deprive” 
seem nearly synonymous.
The legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment also cuts strongly 
against the modern state action requirement. That history makes plain that a 
central purpose of the Amendment was to shield the 1866 Civil Rights Act 
from judicial invalidation.55 The Act, in turn, seemed to mandate positive 
government action to protect all people, at least where white people were al-
ready the beneficiaries of this action. By its terms, the Act guaranteed “full 
and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and 
property, as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . .”56 It therefore protected the very 
sort of “security of person” that DeShaney was denied.57 When the Supreme 
Court first interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment in the Slaughter-House 
Cases, it noted that the Amendment also had this purpose. In Justice Miller’s 
words, the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted because Congress believed 
that newly freed slaves “were at the mercy of bad men, either because the 
laws for their protection were insufficient or were not enforced.”58
Given this understanding, it is not surprising that the Reconstruction 
Congress enacted the Ku Klux Klan Act under its Fourteenth Amendment 
authority. The Act criminalized conduct by private persons acting under 
color of not only “statute,” “ordinance,” or “regulation” but also under the 
“custom” or “usage” of a state.59 That formulation pretty clearly mandates 
affirmative government action to control private parties, at least in circum-
54. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197 n.3.
55. For an account, see William E. Nelson, The Fourteenth Amendment: From 
Political Principle to Judicial Doctrine 104 (1988).
56. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (emphasis added).
57. Id.
58. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 70 (1873).
59. Ku Klux Klan Act, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, 13 (1871). The Supreme Court made clear 
that the Act reached private conduct in United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 639 (1883) (“Un-
der [the Act] private persons are liable to punishment for conspiring to deprive any one of the 
equal protection of the laws enacted by the State.”). Under the influence of the post-New Deal 
state action settlement, see supra Section I.B, the Court eventually upheld the civil counterpart 
to the Act under Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power. See Griffin v. 
Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 105 (1971). The Thirteenth Amendment has no state action re-
quirement. U.S. Const. amend. XIII.
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stances where the private parties are acting in accordance with “custom” and 
“usage.” Similarly, the Civil Rights Act of 1875, enacted pursuant to Con-
gress’s Fourteenth Amendment powers, banned private discrimination in 
public accommodations, thereby once again requiring affirmative public ac-
tion that countered private conduct.60
While it is true that the Supreme Court subsequently invalidated or 
sharply limited these statutes,61 many of those decisions rested on a theory 
that runs directly counter to the modern state action doctrine. In the Civil 
Rights Cases, which contain the Court’s first extended discussion of the state 
action problem, the Court held that the 1875 Civil Rights Act was beyond 
Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment power.62 Importantly, though, it did so 
not because Congress had tried to control private conduct but because of a 
presumption that the states were meeting their affirmative obligation to con-
trol this conduct.63 The Court reached its judgment against the backdrop of a 
widespread understanding that there was a clearly demarcated line between 
the “police power” and a private sphere. The “police power” included a rule 
requiring inns and public carriers to serve all customers.64 On the Court’s 
view, the problem with the Act was that it applied to “States which have the 
justest laws respecting the personal rights of citizens, and whose authorities 
are ever ready to enforce such laws . . . .”65 Victims of private discrimination 
could not show that their rights were violated in circumstances where the 
state stood ready to vindicate those rights. Where a state remedy was availa-
ble, a putative rights violator “cannot destroy or injure the right; he will only 
render himself amenable to satisfaction or punishment; and amenable there-
for[e] to the laws of the State where the wrongful acts are committed.”66
This position rested on the view, articulated more fully in the Slaughter-
House Cases,67 that the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to disrupt 
60. Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335.
61. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (invalidating public accommodations sec-
tion of the Civil Rights Act); Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (invalidating Ku Klux Klan Act as applied to 
private conspiracies); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879) (holding that federal removal stat-
ute inapplicable when state official’s discriminatory action subject to state judicial correction); 
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876) (narrowly reading sections of The Enforce-
ment Act); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875) (invalidating sections of The Enforce-
ment Act relating to right to vote). But see Griffin, 403 U.S. 88 (holding that application of the 
Act to private conspiracies was justified under the Thirteenth Amendment).
62. 109 U.S. 3.
63. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 13. The Court made a similar argument when it struck 
down a federal removal statute in Rives, 100 U.S. 313. It pointed out that federal removal was 
not conditional on a showing that the state was failing to enforce federal rights. Id. at 319.
64. The Court expressly noted that “[i]nnkeepers and public carriers, by the laws of all 
the States, so far as we are aware, are bound, to the extent of their facilities, to furnish proper 
accommodation to all unobjectionable persons who in good faith apply for them.” Civil Rights 
Cases, 109 U.S. at 25.
65. Id. at 14.
66. Id. at 17.
67. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
14 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 117:1
the previous presumption that states stood ready to vindicate rights, with the 
federal government acting only as a backup.68 Whether or not it constitutes a 
correct reading of the Amendment, this interpretation should not be con-
fused with the modern interpretation that Chief Justice Rehnquist articulat-
ed in DeShaney. According to that interpretation, neither the state nor the 
federal government has a constitutional obligation to control private con-
duct.
Justice Bradley—the author of the Civil Rights Cases, and a contempo-
rary of the authors of the Fourteenth Amendment—plainly disagreed. As he 
wrote in private correspondence, the Amendment:
[N]ot only prohibits the making or enforcing of laws which shall abridge the
privileges of the citizen; but prohibits the states from denying to all persons 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. [Denying] includes 
inaction as well as action. And denying the equal protection of the laws in-
cludes the omission to protect, as well as the omission to pass laws for pro-
tection.69
It follows that when the modern Court reads the Civil Rights Cases as estab-
lishing “the essential dichotomy [between] deprivation by the State, subject 
to scrutiny under [the Fourteenth Amendment] and private conduct 
[against] which the Fourteenth Amendment offers no shield,”70 it misrepre-
sents both the holding of the Civil Rights Cases and the history that gave rise 
to it. As originally understood, the Amendment did not reach the private 
conduct itself, but it did reach state inaction that allowed the private conduct 
to occur. In contrast, as DeShaney illustrates, the modern doctrine gives the 
state a free pass when it fails to act.
68. In the Slaughter-House Cases, the Court asked rhetorically whether “it [was] the 
purpose of the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment . . . to transfer the security and protection of all the 
civil rights . . . from the States to the Federal government?” 83 U.S. at 77. Its answer was that 
such a reading would “radically change[] the whole theory of the relations of the State and Fed-
eral governments to each other and of both these governments to the people” and that “no 
such results were intended by the Congress which proposed these amendments, nor by the leg-
islatures of the States which ratified them.” Id. at 78.
69. Letter from Joseph Bradley, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to William Woods, 
Circuit Judge, U.S. Circuit Court for the Fifth Circuit (Mar. 12, 1871), quoted in Nelson, supra
note 55 at196. Judge Woods closely paraphrased this language in United States v. Hall, 26 F. 
Cas. 79, 81 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871) (No. 15,282). For a discussion of Justice Bradley’s views, see 
Michael G. Collins, Justice Bradley’s Civil Rights Odyssey Revisited, 70 Tul. L. Rev. 1979 
(1996).
70. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974).
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B. The Source of the Problem
How, then, did the modern doctrine arise? Before the New Deal, there 
was no more than a smattering of state action decisions.71 The modern state 
action doctrine flourished after the New Deal because it addressed a problem 
that the New Deal constitutionalism created. Briefly stated, the problem was 
how to limit the domain of constitutional law and, hence, judicial power in a 
world where natural barriers between public and private spheres had eroded.
In the period immediately prior to the New Deal revolution, it was wide-
ly thought that the public and private spheres were separated by an imper-
meable, categorical boundary defined by the Constitution. So long as the 
government remained within the public sphere of its police power, it was 
free to act, but the Constitution prohibited legislative invasion of the private 
sphere of individual choice.72
The Civil Rights Cases themselves enforced such a limit on Congress’s 
legislative power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, 
these constitutional limits were not arbitrary or merely the product of histor-
ical happenstance. They reflected natural restrictions on government acces-
sible to anyone ready to think about the problem in a rational and disinter-
ested way. This limit did not mean that constitutional law fully embraced 
libertarianism. There was a large public sphere, defined by custom and the 
common law, where government control was entirely appropriate.73 Im-
portantly, though, this domain was bounded and limited by judicially en-
forced bright-line legal rules that were impervious to extension by analogical 
reasoning.74
If the government was prohibited from acting in certain spheres, then it 
obviously could not be constitutionally compelled to act within those 
spheres. It followed that the government was not responsible for harms in 
71. See, e.g., Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926); Roman Catholic Church of St. 
Anthony of Padua v. Pa. R.R. Co., 237 U.S. 575 (1915).
72. For representative statements of this position, see Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 124–
25 (1877), arguing that the “police power” includes regulation of “the conduct of . . . citizens 
one towards another, and the manner in which each shall use his own property when such reg-
ulation becomes necessary for the public good” but that it does not extend to “rights which are 
purely and exclusively private,” and Christopher G. Tiedman, A Treatise on the Limita-
tions of Police Power in the United States: Considered from Both a Civil and Crim-
inal Standpoint 4 (St. Louis, F.H. Thomas Law Book Co. 1886), “the police power . . . is 
simply the power of the government to establish provisions for the enforcement of the com-
mon as well as civil-law maxim sic utere tuo, ut alienum non loedas. . . . Any law which goes 
beyond that principle, which undertakes to abolish rights, the exercise of which does not in-
volve an infringement of the rights of others, or to limit the exercise of rights beyond what is 
necessary to provide for the public welfare and the general security, cannot be included in the 
police power of the government.” See also Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of 
American Law, 1870-1960, at 27–30 (1992).
73. See infra notes 310–315 and accompanying text.
74. See infra notes 310–318 and accompanying text.
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domains outside its legitimate authority, not because it had failed to act but 
because it was banned from acting.
The New Deal changed all that. Both constitutional and political barriers 
to systematic government intervention eroded.75 Although some scholars 
have recently made concerted efforts to reestablish the barriers,76 the realm 
of legislative discretion remains very broad.77 Many areas once thought to be 
purely private are now part of a mixed regime.78 The modern regulatory state 
rarely ousts private choice from this regime, but the private decisions are 
subject to an overlay of government constraints and incentives.
The upshot is that the modern state action doctrine is about judicial ra-
ther than legislative power. Whereas the Civil Rights Cases limited the power 
of the Congress to act,79 no one doubted that the Wisconsin legislature had 
the power to intervene in DeShaney. Put differently, the modern state action 
doctrine enforces a realm of political discretion where the government may 
(but need not) act, rather than a realm of mandated abstention, where con-
stitutional law or widely held nonconstitutional norms prohibit action.
Creating this realm of discretion was consistent with the criticisms of 
judicial activism that were an important part of New Deal constitutional-
ism.80 If the judiciary were not constrained by the state action requirement, 
there was a risk that the entire social sphere would be subject to constitu-
tional review. We might have moved from a situation where the government 
was prohibited from acting to a situation where courts required the govern-
ment to act. Now that the government could act to control private power, it 
75. See, e.g., David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The New Deal, 
1931-1940, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 504 (1987).
76. For leading academic efforts, see Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Consti-
tution: The Presumption of Liberty (2004), and David E. Bernstein, Rehabilitating 
Lochner: Defending Individual Rights Against Progressive Reform (2011). For critical 
commentary, see, for example, Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, The Return of Lochner, 100
Cornell L. Rev. 527 (2015), and Jeremy K. Kessler, The Early Years of First Amendment 
Lochnerism, 116 Colum. L. Rev. 1915 (2016).
77. See, e.g., Armour v. City of Indianapolis, 566 U.S. 673, 680–81 (2012) (upholding 
statute against equal protection challenge where there was plausible policy reason for it); Nord-
linger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 11 (1992) (same); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 129 (1989) 
(plurality opinion) (rejecting substantive due process challenge to statute providing that child 
born to married woman living with her husband is conclusively presumed to be child of the 
marriage).
78. See infra Part II.
79. See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text.
80. See, e.g., Robert H. Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy x–xi (1941) 
(arguing that by 1933 the Supreme Court had used its power “to cripple other departments of 
government and to disable the nation from adopting social or economic policies which were 
deemed inconsistent with the Justices’ philosophy of property rights”); see also Ferguson v. 
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729–30 (1963) (“There was a time when the Due Process Clause was used 
by this Court to strike down laws which were thought unreasonable, that is, unwise or incom-
patible with some particular economic or social philosophy. [That doctrine] has long since 
been discarded.”).
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would be an easy step to read the text of the Fourteenth Amendment as say-
ing that it must act where constitutional values were threatened. As I have 
argued above,81 this reading is perhaps the most natural interpretation of 
both the text and the Amendment’s legislative history. But many critics of 
Lochner v. New York82 and related cases opposed those decisions because the 
decisions were thought to embody unrestrained judicial activism. These crit-
ics could hardly be happy with a reading of the Fourteenth Amendment that 
gave courts unfettered control of the private sphere.83
Something like the state action doctrine was therefore necessary to pro-
tect a realm of discretion where the political branches were neither required 
to nor prohibited from acting. Unfortunately, New Deal thinking not only 
created the necessity for such a doctrine but also damaged the intellectual 
infrastructure necessary to make the doctrine plausible. As New Deal critics 
of Lochner understood, private action always occurs in the context of back-
ground state action that molds and enables private choice. Bakery owners in 
Lochner could insist on long working hours for bakers only because of state 
contract and property law that allocated power to the owners. There was 
nothing “unnatural” about changing these laws so as to allocate the entitle-
ment to workers. Similarly, the assault in DeShaney was facilitated by state 
child-custody laws that established and enforced the rights of parents over 
children.
In a world where there was a well-established boundary between the po-
lice powers of the state and a private sphere, this background state action 
posed no problem. If certain conduct is “naturally” private, then the state 
bears no responsibility for not making it public. On this view, background 
state action is not really state action at all, but merely a recognition of the 
state of affairs that preceded state intervention. Remnants of that world 
make DeShaney seem like a relatively easy case, at least insofar as state re-
sponsibility might be imputed from the existence of child-custody laws. 
There remains a widespread belief in a “natural,” prepolitical right of parents 
to control the upbringing of their children.84
But New Deal thinking eroded the belief in natural barriers bounding 
areas of economic activity. The result is an unresolved contradiction. On the 
one hand, the “judicial activism” critique of Lochner requires some limit on 
the judiciary’s power to constitutionalize the private sphere. On the other, 
when courts ignore background contract and property law that mold private 
action, they seem to embrace discredited Lochner-like thinking by treating
81. See supra Section I.A.
82. 198 U.S. 45 (1905), abrogated by Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726..
83. Cf. Gary Peller & Mark Tushnet, State Action and a New Birth of Freedom, 92 Geo. 
L.J. 779, 780 (2004) (arguing that Charles Black could not fully extend his criticism of the state 
action doctrine because doing so “was too much like a license for judicial discretion, which was 
the focus of concern in discussions of judicial review as ‘countermajoritarian’ ”).
84. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66–67 (2000) (plurality opinion) (striking 
down state statute as applied because it interfered with parents’ fundamental right “to make 
decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children”).
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the private sphere as “just there” and not created or structured by govern-
ment intervention.
The upshot is an outcome that can satisfy no one. Sometimes, in post-
New Deal fashion, the Court recognizes the mutability of the background 
rules and treats them as “state action” subjecting otherwise private activity to 
constitutional criticism.85 But it has more frequently assumed that these 
rules are invisible for judicial purposes in the same way that the pre–New 
Deal Court assumed their naturalness and immutability for legislative pur-
poses.86 When the Supreme Court takes this latter stance, it never explains 
why Lochner-like reasoning remains acceptable in the judicial sphere but not 
in the legislative sphere.
Critics of the state action doctrine regularly seize on this incoherence to 
argue for abolition of the doctrine. Why not recognize the obvious, they say, 
and admit that the background rules reflect discretionary state decisions that 
are subject to constitutional challenge? Having made this admission, courts 
could then adjudicate the constitutionality of these rules. Many would be 
upheld, not because of the absence of state action but because the state action 
violates no substantive rights.87
Unfortunately, this move only restates the problem and does not solve it. 
Consider, for example, the background rule that allocates property rights to 
media companies like the New York Times, CNN, and Facebook. In an obvi-
ous way, these background rules substantially constrict the ability of many 
people to speak. For example, when Facebook takes down postings that it 
deems offensive, it censors speech almost as effectively as—sometimes more 
effectively than—a government licensing system would.88 Without a state 
action doctrine, courts would need some substantive theory that reconciles 
this power with free speech guarantees. Implicitly or explicitly, the theory 
would necessarily involve a presumption that speech opportunities should be 
allocated by private markets. But that presumption ignores the background, 
public rules that structure private markets and, therefore, reintroduces Loch-
ner-like thinking through the back door. Consequently, even a substantive 
theory that supposedly avoids the contradictions of the state action doctrine 
actually only replicates the contradictions.
For these reasons, the debate about the state action doctrine has reached 
an impasse. At least in the academy, there is widespread recognition that the 
85. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 
(1946).
86. See, e.g., Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 
407 U.S. 163 (1972).
87. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
88. See, e.g., Community Standards, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/community
standards/ [https://perma.cc/5MWM-DG3Q] (providing guidance for when and how Face-
book will remove user content).
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doctrine is unsatisfactory,89 but there is also no plausible way to get rid of it. 
The difficulty is part of a broader problem of formulating constitutional doc-
trine in the absence of natural law baselines. Of course, for modern libertari-
ans who want to reestablish these baselines, this is not a difficulty at all; it 
only demonstrates the correctness of their position. For the rest of us, there 
seems no choice but to live with the incoherence.
C. The Middle Band Emerges
All this assumes that the state action doctrine marks a boundary be-
tween a public and private sphere. It turns out that the assumption is wrong. 
The assumption was once right, at least in theory if not actual practice. Ac-
cording to a highly stylized and simplified version of late nineteenth-century 
constitutionalism, there were originally only two spheres: the public sphere 
of police power, where the government was free to act, and the private 
sphere of individual choice, where people could exercise freedom without 
government constraints. What most constitutional law amounted to was po-
licing this boundary by protecting imperialistic invasions of the private by 
the public.90
This classical version still describes state action “doctrine,” if by this one 
means the accumulation of decisions in cases where the Supreme Court la-
bels a constitutional problem as requiring a decision respecting “state ac-
tion.” But the classical version of constitutionalism is no longer our official 
story in most of the rest of constitutional law. As the old view began to 
erode, the Court became more skeptical of constitutional tests that depended 
upon bright-line, categorical divisions between public and private. Its new 
approach is neatly captured by its statements that “there is no closed class or 
category of businesses affected with a public interest”91 and that the legitima-
cy of federal regulation no longer turns on whether the activity’s “effect is 
what might at some earlier time have been defined as ‘direct’ or ‘indirect.’ ”92
Instead of insisting on a categorical approach that sharply bounded public 
and private spheres and policing that boundary by constitutional fiat, the 
89. See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1367
(2003); supra notes 5–8.
90. According to William J. Novak, this regime replaced a much more fluid regime of 
regulation that existed throughout most of the nineteenth century. See generally William J. 
Novak, The People’s Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth-Century America
(1996). Novak’s account emphasizes how the earlier regime, marked by an interweaving of 
power and liberty “in self-regulating, common law communities” was replaced by the late 
nineteenth century regime marked by a sharp division between the domains of power and lib-
erty, with the two “kept in balance only through the magnetic genius of an ascendant Ameri-
can constitutionalism.” Id. at 241.
91. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 536 (1934).
92. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942).
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Court permitted a messy intermixing of the two with indistinct and shifting 
boundaries delineated by the political process.93
This intermixing did not mean that the Court completely stayed its hand 
or that categorical approaches lost all of their force. It did mean, however, 
that there were now three bands of state action rather than the original two. 
The outer and inner bands of police power and individual freedom re-
mained. Constitutionalism was relatively unimportant in these two bands, 
either because government power is justified (the outer, public band) or be-
cause it is perceived to be absent (the inner, private band). What changed 
was the emergence of a middle band that is neither fully public nor fully pri-
vate. Within this band, private power remains, but it is disciplined by more 
or less stringent public regulation.
The middle band is where modern constitutionalism takes hold. Instead 
of enforcing boundaries between public and private spheres, much of mod-
ern constitutionalism deals with the special pathologies thought to be the 
product of the mixture of public and private.94 Where the mixture is ab-
sent—where a domain is perceived as either purely public or purely pri-
vate—the Constitution has little work to do.95
II. The Cases, the Doctrine, and the Middle Band
State action’s tripartite character is a feature of many disparate areas of 
constitutional law. I make no claim that the structure exists in every doctri-
nal domain. Nor do I claim that all the examples I provide below have pre-
cisely the same structure. For example, sometimes the government moves 
from the middle to the outer band by depriving more people of the putative 
93. I do not mean to claim that the merging of public and private institutions was un-
precedented before the New Deal. It was not. But the importance and acceptance of the merger 
was new. See infra Part IV.
94. Concern about these pathologies has obvious ties to a republican conception of con-
stitutional law, which sees the Constitution as providing protection of public institutions 
against the corrupting influence of private power. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in 
American Public Law, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 29, 32 (1985) (noting classical republican fear of cor-
ruption of public institutions by private power) [hereinafter Sunstein, Interest Groups in Amer-
ican Public Law]; cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1689, 1690 (1984) (arguing that the Constitution prohibits legislation based solely on 
“naked” private preferences and that this prohibition is rooted in the Framers’ “fear that gov-
ernment power would be usurped solely to distribute wealth or opportunities to one group or 
person at the expense of another”).
95. To be clear, I do not mean to reject the standard critique of state action doctrine that 
insists that public power is always present. See supra Section I.B. Just as the doctrine’s critics 
claim, the inner band exists only because the Court assumes the “naturalness” of background 
state action in a fashion that is in tension with its rejection of Lochner-like reasoning. My claim 
is only about how the Court perceives the inner band when it ignores background state action.
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constitutional right.96 Sometimes, it gains the benefit of outer band status by 
invading the right in a more serious fashion.97 On still other occasions, the 
state can free itself of constitutional constraints by regulating more vigorous-
ly activity not associated with the putative right.98 My claim is only that the 
tripartite structure in different doctrinal domains is similar enough, para-
doxical enough, and exists often enough to warrant notice and explanation.
This is not to say that the outer band of “too much state action” func-
tions in exactly the same way as the inner band of “no state action.” For the 
most part, the inner band is transsubstantive. Private parties who are not as-
sisted by the government in ways that register with conventional state action 
doctrine can do anything at all without encountering constitutional objec-
tion. The outer band is often more limited: when the government expands its 
power, it evades some, but often not all, constitutional constraints. The gov-
ernment might be able to force unwilling participants to obtain insurance if 
it took over the insurance markets, but it does not follow that the govern-
ment could use racial classifications to set insurance rates.
But although the outer and inner bands are not perfect mirror images, it 
remains analytically useful to emphasize the symmetry between them. The 
fact is that the Constitution often loses (some of) its force not only when the 
government does too little but also when it does too much. That fact requires 
some explanation, and this Article attempts to provide it.
This Part builds the cumulative case for the phenomenon. It mostly ig-
nores possible justifications and explanations for the outcomes it describes—
a matter I turn to in Parts III and IV.
A. Federalism Limitations
In the healthcare context, we have already seen how the Constitution 
sometimes gives the federal government more power when it chooses to in-
vade the private sphere more aggressively.99 Other federalism principles fol-
low a similar pattern.
The negative implications of the Commerce Clause provide the first ex-
ample. It is well established that when states regulate private markets, they 
may not do so in ways that discriminate against out-of-state market partici-
pants.100 A complex and not altogether consistent body of doctrine attempts 
to draw a line between legitimate regulation on the one hand and protection-
96. For example, in some areas of Fourth Amendment law, the government can defeat a 
constitutional challenge by invading the privacy or autonomy of more people. See infra Section 
II.D.2.
97. Some Free Exercise and Takings jurisprudence has this structure. See infra Section 
II.C.2.
98. Some Commerce Clause and Self-Incrimination cases provide examples. See infra
Sections II.A., II.D.1.
99. See supra notes 30–42 and accompanying text (discussing Sebelius).
100. See, e.g., New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988); Bos. Stock Exch. v. 
State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977).
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ist discrimination on the other.101 But suppose that instead of regulating pri-
vate markets, the state makes part or all of the market public. When a state 
acts as a “market participant,” all the Commerce Clause limitations that 
would otherwise exist fall away.
Consider, for example, Reeves, Inc. v. Stake.102 For over half a century, 
South Dakota (an unlikely last bastion of American socialism) had owned 
and operated a cement plant.103 The state insisted that it would provide no 
cement to out-of-state purchasers until it had met the needs of all its in-state 
customers.104 Had the state attempted to impose this rule on private compa-
nies, its actions would have been unconstitutional.105 But because it had en-
tered an otherwise private market rather than merely regulating the market, 
its actions were immune from challenge.106
The market-participant doctrine therefore illustrates state action’s tri-
partite structure. If the state leaves a private business to its own devices, the 
case is in the inner band, and neither the state nor the business is constitu-
tionally liable if the business discriminates against out-of-state customers. If 
the state instead regulates the business, it operates in the middle band and is 
subject to constitutional prohibitions on discrimination. But if the state takes 
over the business and runs it itself, then it is in the outer band and regains 
constitutional immunity from Commerce Clause attack.
An analogous principle governs doctrine concerning the mirror image 
limitations on the federal government. The “anticommandeering” principle 
prohibits the federal government from “comandee[ring] the legislative pro-
cesses of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a feder-
al regulatory program.”107 For example, Congress may not require states to 
regulate radioactive waste in the manner that Congress prefers,108 to force 
state executive officials to conduct background checks before firearms can be 
101. Compare, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117 (1978) (finding legiti-
mate regulation), with C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994) (finding 
protectionist discrimination).
102. 447 U.S. 429 (1980); see also Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976); 
cf. S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984) (plurality opinion in part) (pro-
hibiting “downstream” restrictions based on state ownership). For an attempt to domesticate 
the doctrine by reducing it to a distinction between penalties and subsidies, see Laurence H. 
Tribe, Constitutional Choices 145 (1985).
103. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 430.
104. Id. at 432–33.
105. See id. at 436–37 (“[T]he Commerce Clause responds principally to state taxes and 
regulatory measures impeding free private trade in the national marketplace. . . . There is no 
indication of a constitutional plan to limit the ability of the States themselves to operate freely 
in the free market.”).
106. See id. at 440–41; see also Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 809 (“We do not believe the 
Commerce Clause was intended to require independent justification for such action.”).
107. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface 
Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)).
108. New York, 505 U.S. 144.
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lawfully purchased,109 or to require state legislatures to refrain from author-
izing gambling.110 This principle has the effect of constitutionally limiting 
the extent to which the federal government can jointly administer regulatory 
regimes. A cooperative approach advances federal policy goals on the macro 
level, while providing local officials with some discretion on the micro level 
as to how to achieve the federal objectives. Put differently, a cooperative ap-
proach is firmly situated within the mixed middle band of regulation. It lies
between an outer band approach, under which the federal government runs 
the entire program, and an inner band approach, under which the federal 
government leaves the states entirely free from federal control.
Under current doctrine, constitutional restrictions that limit the federal 
government in the middle band disappear when the federal government 
moves to the outer band by completely displacing state authority. The Court 
has made clear that so long as Congress is acting within one of its delegated 
powers, it may preempt state law and regulate the activity directly.111 There 
is therefore a sense in which anticommendeering doctrine limits the federal 
government more if it does less. As Justice White argued in a separate opin-
ion, the doctrine “gives Congress fewer incentives to defer to the wishes of 
state officials in achieving local solutions to local problems.”112 Complete 
displacement puts federal action in the outer band of discretion, while partial 
displacement puts the action in the middle band of constraint.
Despite the “anticommandeering” principle, the Court has allowed the 
federal government to “tempt” the states to manage federal programs with 
grants made under the spending power of Article I.113 Even conditional 
spending may be unconstitutional, however, when “pressure turns into 
compulsion,”114 and this is especially likely to occur when the “conditions 
take the form of threats to terminate other significant independent 
grants.”115 The Court applied these principles to invalidate provisions of the 
109. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
110. Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).
111. New York, 505 U.S. at 167 (“[W]here Congress has the authority to regulate private 
activity under the Commerce Clause, we have recognized Congress’ power to offer States the 
choice of regulating that activity according to federal standards or having state law pre-empted 
by federal regulation.”).
112. Id. at 210 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Even some defenders 
of the Court’s anticommandeering jurisprudence have recognized this paradox. See, e.g., Ro-
derick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy 
Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 813, 817–18 (1998) (“Federal 
demands that state and local officials implement federal policies at least preserve some role for 
such officials. By contrast, preemption eliminates their role entirely.”).
113. New York, 505 U.S. at 166 (Congress may “encourage a State to regulate in a particu-
lar way,” and “hold out incentives to the States as a method of influencing a State’s policy 
choices”).
114. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Da-
vis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).
115. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 580 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, 
C.J.).
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ACA that terminated all federal Medicaid funding if states declined to ex-
tend Medicaid benefits to a new group.116
This constitutional limitation adheres to the tripartite structure in a 
fashion analogous to the anticommandeering cases. If the federal govern-
ment provides relatively unrestricted funding, leaving the states free to spend 
the funds as they wish, the case is in the inner band of constitutional discre-
tion. There has been insufficient “state action” (actually, federal action) to 
trigger constitutional scrutiny. If the federal government displaces the states
entirely and federalizes all decisions about Medicaid, it is in the outer band 
of constitutional discretion. The federal government has “acted” so forcefully 
that constitutional restrictions are again inappropriate. But because the 
Medicaid expansion portion of the ACA was in the middle band—providing 
some, but not enough, decisionmaking autonomy to the states—it was con-
stitutionally vulnerable.117
B. Separation of Powers
A similar principle structures some aspects of horizontal constitutional 
rules, although the connection of these rules to the state action doctrine is 
less obvious because the “state action” concerns a single branch of the gov-
ernment rather than the government as a whole.
In theory, Congress may not delegate its legislative authority to execu-
tive branch officials,118 but in practice, the Court has permitted large-scale 
delegation under very broad standards.119 Congress therefore has the choice 
of washing its hands of the problem and turning it over to an administrative 
agency or doing the job itself by enacting detailed statutory provisions. The 
first option amounts to insufficient state action (here congressional action) 
116. Id. at 575–85.
117. Of course, the fact that the program is vulnerable does not mean that it will neces-
sarily be invalidated. In the Sebelius situation, matters were complicated by the fact that the 
middle band, itself, is segmented. If the federal spending is moderate, the state may only be 
“tempted” in a constitutionally permissible way. More extensive federal subvention might turn 
the “temptation” into unconstitutional “coercion,” as the Court in fact determined in Sebelius.
The important point, though, is that this middle band of constitutional review is sandwiched 
between an outer band where the federal government altogether preempts state law and an 
inner band where the federal government does nothing to restrict state activity. In both the 
outer and inner bands, constitutional review does not take hold.
118. E.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935) (“The 
Congress is not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others the essential legislative functions 
with which it is thus vested.”).
119. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472–76 (2001); Touby v. 
United States, 500 U.S. 160, 164–69 (1991). See generally Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, 
Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1721 (2002) (arguing that the non-
delegation doctrine has been applied so sparingly that it doesn’t actually exist).
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to trigger constitutional restraints.120 The second option entails congression-
al action that is too vigorous to trigger these restraints. Suppose, though, that 
Congress chooses a middle position. Congress might want the agency to 
have primary responsibility, but it also might want to retain some control for 
itself by, for example, reserving the power to veto the agency’s decisions or 
the power to appoint or dismiss agency officials. Although the Court has 
permitted both outer and inner band solutions, it has sharply restricted use 
of the middle band.121 Even though a near total delegation is constitutionally 
permissible, a less aggressive solution that retains some congressional con-
trol violates the Constitution.
The Court has tied itself into knots trying to explain this paradox. Mid-
dle band solutions under which Congress retains some control are said to 
violate executive power.122 But how could the power be “executive” when 
Congress might opt for the outer band solution of exercising the power it-
self?123 Just as it is difficult to understand how state power is invaded when 
the federal government gives states some role in administering a federal pro-
gram, so too it is hard to see how Congress is invading executive power 
when it delegates some, but not total, lawmaking authority to executive-
branch officials.
But whether or not this doctrine makes logical sense, it responds to an 
intuition that Congress must either be all in or all out. It can “act” by taking 
full responsibility for legislating in an area or “not act” by turning it over to 
executive officials. A constitutional problem arises only when it opts for a 
middle band, mixed system where it has done a little bit of both.
C. The First Amendment
1. Freedom of speech. Free speech cases provide especially dramatic ex-
amples of situations where more aggressive state intervention into a puta-
tively private sphere serves to immunize government action from constitu-
tional challenge.
120. I am putting to one side the possible existence of a “major questions canon,” U.S. 
Telecomm. Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 422 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting in the 
denial of rehearing en banc), that limits, either as a matter of statutory construction or consti-
tutional law, the ability of Congress to delegate a “question of deep ‘economic and political sig-
nificance’ that is central to [a] statutory scheme.” King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) 
(quoting Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014)); see also Util. Air Reg-
ulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 
U.S. 120 (2000).
121. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (removal); Immigration and Natu-
ralization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (veto); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (ap-
pointment).
122. See, e.g., Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 736 (statute “violate[d] the command of the Constitu-
tion that the Congress play no role in the execution of the laws”).
123. See id. at 750–51 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that the fallback 
position in the statute would grant to Congress itself powers granted to the Comptroller Gen-
eral).
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Consider, for example, commercial speech doctrine. Beginning with its 
initial formulation of the modern doctrine, the Court has made clear that 
constitutional protection does not extend to commercial speech advocating 
“transactions [that] are themselves illegal in any way.”124 Suppose, though, 
that the transaction is legal but might be made illegal. In Posadas de Puerto 
Rico Associates v. Tourism Co., the Court upheld a statute that sharply re-
stricted advertising of legal gambling.125 Writing for the Court, Justice 
Rehnquist reasoned that because Puerto Rico could have outlawed gambling 
altogether, it could also:
take the less intrusive step of allowing the conduct, but reducing the de-
mand through restrictions on advertising. It would surely be a Pyrrhic vic-
tory for casino owners . . . to gain recognition of a First Amendment right 
to advertise their casinos . . . only to thereby force the legislature into ban-
ning casino gambling . . . altogether. It would just as surely be a strange 
constitutional doctrine which would concede to the legislature the authori-
ty to totally ban a product or activity, but deny to the legislature the author-
ity to forbid the stimulation of demand for the product or activity through 
advertising on behalf of those who would profit from such increased de-
mand.126
The Posadas Court rejected state action’s tripartite structure. It held that free 
speech protection should not vary depending upon the government’s choice 
between the outer and middle bands.
But Posadas was later disavowed by the Court.127 The Court’s current 
position is that the government is subject to First Amendment strictures 
when it permits the underlying activity but may avoid them when the activi-
ty is outlawed. For example, the government could, if it wished, aggressively 
regulate private markets by outlawing the sale of liquor or tobacco products. 
If it did so, then it could also outlaw commercial speech encouraging the use 
of these products. But if the government chooses to act less aggressively and 
leave private markets alone, then there are heightened speech protections.128
Perhaps there are good First Amendment reasons for adhering to this 
position even if it produces “Pyrrhic victor[ies]” for those engaged in the 
underlying activity.129 There can be no doubt, though, that the position re-
124. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772 
(1976).
125. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
126. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 346.
127. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 510 (1996) (opinion of Ste-
vens, J.) (“Because the 5-to-4 decision in Posadas marked such a sharp break with our prior 
precedent, and because it concerned a constitutional question about which this Court is the 
final arbiter, we decline to give force to its highly deferential approach.”).
128. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 564–66 (2001); 44 Liquormart, 517 
U.S. at 489; Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 478 (1995).
129. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial 
Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 429, 443–44 (1971) 
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flects state action’s tripartite structure. If the government leaves the conduct 
entirely unregulated, conventional state action principles deprive First 
Amendment prohibitions of any force. If the government entirely outlaws 
the activity, the First Amendment similarly loses its force. Only when the 
case falls in the middle band, where the government permits the activity but 
regulates speech advocating it, does the First Amendment apply.
There are also other examples where the more the government invades 
the public sphere, the less the First Amendment protects speech. We have 
already seen how the Walker Court utilized the government speech doctrine 
to constitutionally immunize state action in the outer band.130 In Walker,
there was no claim that anyone was forced to fund government speech with 
which they disagreed, but it is obvious that no one has a right to avoid fund-
ing such speech. As Justice Kennedy wrote in Board of Regents of the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin System v. Southworth:131
It is inevitable that government will adopt and pursue programs and poli-
cies within its constitutional powers but which nevertheless are contrary to 
the profound beliefs and sincere convictions of some of its citizens. The 
government, as a general rule, may support valid programs and policies by 
taxes or other exactions binding on protesting parties.132
The situation is dramatically different when individuals are compelled to 
support private speech. Although the doctrine is confused and inconsistent, 
in at least some situations, the First Amendment bars compelled funding 
when private individuals determine the content of the speech.133 For exam-
ple, although taxpayers have no right to abstain from paying for government 
speech that they oppose, government workers do have a right to refuse to 
pay union dues that support private political activity with which they disa-
gree.134
On conventional state action premises, this result seems paradoxical. It 
means, for example, that if Texas “privatized” its licensing of automobiles, it 
might be subject to the constitutional strictures that it avoided in Walker.
Similarly, in the union dues cases, the Court has upheld the right of individ-
(“[C]ommercial speech furthers legitimate first amendment purposes. When the individual is 
presented with rational grounds for preferring one product or brand over another, he is en-
couraged to . . . exercise his abilities to reason and think; this aids him towards the intangible 
goal of rational self-fulfillment.”). But cf. R.H. Coase, Advertising and Free Speech, 6 J. Legal 
Stud. 1, 2 (1977) (noting the inconsistency when “government action. . . . is regarded as in-
competent and untrustworthy” in the marketplace of ideas and yet “efficient and reliable” in 
the marketplace of goods).
130. See supra notes 9–29 and accompanying text.
131. 529 U.S. 217 (2000).
132. Southworth, 529 U.S. at 229.
133. See, e.g., Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 559 (2005) (“In all of the 
cases invalidating exactions to subsidize speech, the speech was, or was presumed to be, that of 
an entity other than the government itself.”); United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 
(2001); Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990).
134. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
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ual objectors when the speech is by a private actor (the union).135 The Court 
has even said that there are “serious” constitutional arguments that individ-
ual objectors have this right when the compulsion arises from a collective 
bargaining agreement between a private union and a private employer.136 In 
contrast, government speech cases involve compulsion in the form of a stat-
ute and speech by a state agency. The First Amendment prohibits compelled 
support of private speech, perhaps even when the compulsion is applied by a 
private actor, but not public compulsion of public speech. The thoroughly 
public character of compelled support of government speech drives the case 
into the outer band and thus eliminates free speech protections.
The same pattern emerges in cases where government prohibits some, 
but not all, private speech. For example, in Police Department of Chicago v. 
Mosley,137 the Court invalidated an ordinance that prohibited picketing near 
a school except for picketing of a school involved in a labor dispute. Obvi-
ously, a rule that left picketing entirely within the private sphere by not regu-
lating it at all would not implicate the Constitution even if private actors 
made the picketing impossible.138 Perhaps less obviously, the Court also sug-
gests that a rule that prohibited all picketing near schools might survive con-
stitutional attack.139 But because the government prohibited some, but not 
all, picketing, it ran into constitutional difficulty.
Mosley is an early example of the Court’s preoccupation with the princi-
ple of content neutrality—perhaps the central analytic tool in modern free 
speech jurisprudence.140 If regulation of speech is “content based,” then the 
speech is subject to strict scrutiny and is invalid unless narrowly tailored to 
serve a compelling state interest, at least if it falls in the “high value” catego-
ry.141 In contrast, if the regulation is “content neutral,” then it is subject to a 
less exacting balancing test.142
135. E.g., Id.; Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235–36 (1977).
136. See Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 749, 765–70 (1961).
137. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
138. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (private shopping center owner can con-
stitutionally prohibit picketing).
139. See Mosley, 408 U.S. at 99 (suggesting that a city has “a substantial interest in stop-
ping picketing which disrupts a school” so long as it does not discriminate).
140. See Elena Kagan, The Changing Faces of First Amendment Neutrality: R.A.V. v. St. 
Paul, Rust v. Sullivan, and the Problem of Content-Based Underinclusion, 1992 Sup. Ct. Rev. 
29; Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 46 (1987).
141. See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015) (“Content-based 
laws—those that target speech based on its communicative content—are presumptively uncon-
stitutional and may be justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored 
to serve compelling state interests.”).
142. See, e.g., United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 687–88 (1985) (“Application of a 
facially neutral regulation that incidentally burdens speech satisfies the First Amendment if it 
‘furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is un-
related to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First 
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Once again, the government is less likely to be constitutionally con-
strained if it moves into the outer band by doing more. All else equal, con-
tent-based restrictions regulate less speech because they are targeted only at 
objectionable content. A content-neutral restriction sweeps more broadly by
prohibiting all speech. By restricting more of the activity the Constitution 
seemingly protects, the government is subject to fewer constraints.
The same principle applies if a regulation of conduct is supported only 
by concern for the conduct’s communicative content. The government may 
punish flag burning as part of a broader scheme that outlaws setting fires in 
public places,143 but if it outlaws flag burning in order to suppress the views 
that the burning expresses, it runs afoul of the First Amendment.144 From 
the flag burner’s perspective, both laws prevent her from expressing her 
views by burning a flag, but only the first law, which controls the actions of 
more people, runs afoul of the First Amendment.
Content-neutrality doctrine intersects in a complex fashion with the 
Court’s public forum rules. If the activity takes place in a “quintessential 
public forum[]” like public streets or parks, then, even if the regulation is 
content neutral, the government must show that the regulation is “narrowly 
tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample al-
ternative channels of communication.”145 For present purposes, the more in-
teresting categories are “designated” public fora and “limited purpose” pub-
lic fora.146 If a state voluntarily designates an area as open to expressive 
activity, then it has created a public forum subject to the same restrictive 
standards that apply to quintessential public fora.147 If a public forum is 
“limited,” then the state must permit speech that is relevant to the forum’s 
purpose.148 But the state can convert a designated forum into the “nonpub-
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.’ ”
(quoting United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968))).
143. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Essay Flag Burning and the Constitution, 75 Iowa L. Rev. 111, 
117 (1989) (case invalidating flag burning ordinance does not control situation where a person 
burns a flag and is prosecuted under an open fire ordinance).
144. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 315 (1990) (“Although the Flag Protec-
tion Act contains no explicit content-based limitation on the scope of prohibited conduct, it is 
nevertheless clear that the Government’s asserted interest is ‘related to the suppression of free 
expression.’ ” (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 410 (1989))).
145. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
146. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678 (1998) (describing 
designated public forum); Rosenberg v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 
(1995) (describing limited public forum).
147. See Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45–46 (binding the government to “the same 
standards as apply in a traditional public forum” when it opens property for expressive activi-
ty).
148. See Rosenberg, 515 U.S. at 829 (holding that the state is permitted to “[confine] a 
forum to the limited and legitimate purposes for which it was created”).
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lic” status and can define the purpose of a limited public forum.149 As a prac-
tical matter, this means that the government can “buy” more discretion to 
limit speech when it acts more aggressively to make the forum nonpublic or 
to limit its purpose. If the government restricts speech opportunities more 
by keeping all speakers out, or by more narrowly defining the purpose of a 
forum, its activities are in the outer band and subject to greater deference. If 
it permits more speech, then its activities are in the middle band of con-
straint and subject to enhanced constitutional scrutiny.
2. Free exercise. Finally, consider the First Amendment’s free exercise 
protections. In Sherbert v. Verner, a Seventh-day Adventist who had been 
fired by her employer because she would not work on Saturday was denied 
unemployment compensation on the ground that she lacked good cause to 
refuse suitable work.150 The Court held that denial of the benefits impermis-
sibly burdened the plaintiff’s free exercise of religion despite the fact that the 
plaintiff would have suffered the same burden if there had been no unem-
ployment insurance at all.151 If the state had done nothing, the plaintiff 
would have been no better off, but the absence of state action would have 
doomed her constitutional challenge; the state was under no constitutional 
obligation to dissipate pressure that her private employer put on her reli-
gious beliefs. The case would therefore fall within the inner band. If the state 
had provided funding for everyone, there would have been no burden on re-
ligion to complain about. The case would have been in the outer band. But 
because the state provided funding to some but not others, its actions were 
unconstitutional.152
In recent years, the Court has sharply limited the extent to which facially 
neutral statutes can be challenged on free exercise grounds.153 But it has 
done so in two ways that once again conform to the tripartite structure.
First, the Court has distinguished between what the government itself 
does and what it forces individuals to do to themselves. In Lyng v. Northwest 
149. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 
(1985) (allowing exclusion of topics and speakers from nonpublic forum “so long as [they] are 
reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral”).
150. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
151. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403–06.
152. See id. at 405–06. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012
(2017) (plurality opinion in part), has a similar structure. There, the Court struck down the 
state’s refusal to provide a grant to a church to resurface its playground in circumstances where 
a secular institution would have received the grant. Id. at 2017–18. Despite the fact that the 
church would have been no better off if there had been no grant program in the first place, the 
Court held that the failure to award the grant unconstitutionally pressured the free exercise of 
religion. Id. at 2022.
153. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (individual religious beliefs do not ex-
cuse compliance with otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the state is free to regulate); 
Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (concluding that the Free 
Exercise Clause offers no protection against how the government conducts its internal affairs); 
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (plurality opinion in part) (same).
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Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, it rejected a challenge to the government’s 
construction of a road in an area traditionally used by American Indians for 
religious rituals.154 The Court acknowledged that “the challenged Govern-
ment action would interfere significantly with private persons’ ability to pur-
sue spiritual fulfillment according to their own religious beliefs.”155 Yet the 
First Amendment was not violated because “the affected individuals [were 
not] coerced by the Government’s action into violating their religious be-
liefs.”156
It seems to follow that a government program that offers individuals 
more choice is also more vulnerable to Free Exercise challenge. Suppose, for 
example, the government told an American Indian tribe that it would have 
to forego a tax exemption if it denied the government an easement to build a 
road over its sacred land. There is a sense in which this declaration leaves the 
tribe freer than they would be if the government simply built the road, as it 
did in Lyng. The tribe might still lose use of the land if they claimed the tax 
exemption, but at least they would have an additional option to keep the 
land and pay the price if that option seemed preferable. Yet somehow 
providing this option makes government action more vulnerable to free ex-
ercise challenge. In the Court’s words, the option might cause the tribe to be 
“coerced by the Government’s action into violating their religious beliefs.”157
The second and more significant modern limitation on free exercise 
rights was announced in Employment Division v. Smith, where the Court re-
jected a free exercise challenge to a statute that criminalized possession of 
peyote as applied to a person who used the substance as part of a religious 
ritual.158 The Court held that a neutral and generally applicable statute did 
not violate free exercise even if it was applied to an individual engaged in re-
ligious practice.159 But Smith itself is subject to a limitation. In Church of the 
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah the Court invalidated a statute 
that banned ritual slaughter as applied to animal sacrifices conducted for re-
ligious reasons.160 The cases were different, the Court thought, because the 
Lukumi ordinance was “gerrymandered with care to proscribe religious kill-
ings of animals but to exclude almost all secular killings.”161
Taken together, Smith and Lukumi yet again illustrate state action’s tri-
partite structure. The religious group harmed by the Lukumi ordinance 
would have been no better off if the state had controlled more private con-
154. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
155. Id. at 449.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. 494 U.S. 872.
159. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878–79.
160. 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (plurality opinion in part).
161. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 542.
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duct by targeting secular as well as religious animal slaughter.162 In that case, 
though, the statute would have been in the outer band and, under Smith,
immune from a Free Exercise challenge. Because the state did less and 
banned only religious slaughter, it found itself in the middle band of consti-
tutional constraint.
D. Criminal Procedure
Criminal procedure rules have not been a central battleground in the ar-
guments over state action. Still, the Court has made clear that neither the 
Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure nor 
the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination reach-
es purely private conduct. When private individuals blew up someone’s safe 
and stole his papers, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment 
posed no obstacle to government presentation of the papers to a grand ju-
ry.163 In a case where a defendant claimed that his self-incrimination rights 
were violated because he felt compelled by the voice of God to confess, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist wrote that “however important or significant such a per-
ception may be in other disciplines, [it] is a matter to which the United 
States Constitution does not speak.”164
Less noticed, though, is the fact that Fourth and Fifth Amendment pro-
tections also evaporate when there is too much government activity.
1. Self-incrimination. It is black-letter law that in order to trigger the 
Fifth Amendment privilege, there must be both compulsion and incrimina-
tion.165 Each of these requirements implicates government action. The com-
pulsion must be applied by government agents, and the incrimination must 
be before government tribunals.166 But the compulsion prong also means 
that the Constitution permits the government to avoid self-incrimination 
limitations when it chooses to act more, rather than less, aggressively.
For example, the presence of the self-incrimination privilege sometimes 
turns on whether the government has granted an entitlement to private per-
sons or retained the entitlement itself. If an individual must prove something 
162. It is possible that a court would invalidate even a broader ban if it thought that it, 
too, was a “gerrymander” infected by an unconstitutional purpose. The example in text as-
sumes that the legislative purpose related to animal sacrifice rather than to religious belief. For 
a discussion of the relationship between legislative purpose and middle band analysis, see infra
Section III.B.3.
163. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921).
164. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170–71 (1986).
165. See, e.g., Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 766–67 (2003) (plurality opin-
ion)(compelling statement does not violate the Fifth Amendment unless statement used in 
criminal trial); Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 653 (1976) (holding that the use of state-
ments in a criminal trial does not violate the Fifth Amendment unless the statements are com-
pelled).
166. See Chavez, 538 U.S. at 767.
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in order to get a benefit from the government, she cannot rely on the Fifth 
Amendment privilege to meet her burden of proof.167 If the individual is al-
ready entitled to the benefit, then the government cannot take it away be-
cause the individual has invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege.168
This distinction, captured by the maxim that the privilege can act as a 
shield but not as a sword, entails a surprising conclusion169: it means that if 
the government has the power to shift the entitlement from the individual to 
itself, then it can avoid Fifth Amendment difficulties by asserting more gov-
ernment control. So long as there is a private entitlement, the threat to take it 
away unless a suspect incriminates himself counts as Fifth Amendment 
compulsion. The individual can “shield” himself from the deprivation by in-
voking his privilege.170 But the government can achieve the outcome it wants 
by insisting that the initial entitlement is public.
A concrete example helps to elucidate the difference. Suppose that the 
government suspects that its employees are taking bribes. It might call the 
employees before a grand jury and threaten them with dismissal if they in-
voke their Fifth Amendment rights and refuse to answer questions. The Su-
preme Court has held that this tactic violates the Fifth Amendment: the 
grand jury testimony might be incriminating, and the threat of job loss 
counts as “compulsion” prohibited by the Self-Incrimination Clause.171
But this outcome seems to rest on the assumption that the employees 
have an entitlement to continued employment. Contrast that case with a sit-
uation where an individual has the burden of proving that he is entitled to a 
government benefit. No one supposes that a government employee could 
submit a request for reimbursement of expenses and be entitled to payment 
when she claimed the Fifth Amendment in response to an inquiry as to what 
the expenses were for.172 Similarly, if the government made employees regu-
larly prove their entitlement to their jobs, it would seem to follow that it 
167. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 212 (1971), judgment vacated sub nom.
Crampton v. Ohio, 408 U.S. 941 (1972).
168. See McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 65 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
169. See, e.g., United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 758 (1983) (“We think the view of 
the Court of Appeals would convert the privilege from the shield against compulsory self-
incrimination which it was intended to be into a sword whereby a claimant asserting the privi-
lege would be freed from adducing proof in support of a burden which would otherwise have 
been his.”).
170. See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977) (entitlement to public of-
fice); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973) (entitlement to contract with the government); 
Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968) (entitlement to government employment).
171. See Gardner, 392 U.S. at 278–79.
172. Cf. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272 (1998) (plurality opinion in 
part) (holding that self-incrimination privilege not violated by “voluntary” interview at which 
sentenced individual has burden of demonstrating that he is entitled to clemency); Selective 
Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Grp., 468 U.S. 841 (1984) (holding Self-
Incrimination Clause not violated by requirement that applicants for student loans certify that 
they have registered for the draft); Rylander, 460 U.S. 757–61 (holding that a person cannot 
meet burden of proof by asserting the privilege against self-incrimination).
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could force them to meet their burden by testifying truthfully to a grand ju-
ry.173
Of course, the Constitution itself requires that some entitlements remain 
in the private sphere. The government could not make one prove that she 
was not a criminal in order to have the right to join a religion or stay out of 
prison. But the New Deal revolution gives the government the ability to keep 
many entitlements for itself. For example, it can make people prove that they 
are fit to engage in many common occupations174 or receive a host of gov-
ernment benefits.175 Whenever the government takes advantage of its discre-
tion to expand the public sector, it can also eviscerate self-incrimination 
rights.
The preference for more aggressive tactics leads to similarly paradoxical 
results in other areas of Fifth Amendment law. Suppose the government has 
probable cause to believe that an individual possesses a gun used in a mur-
der. At least in theory, a grand jury could subpoena the gun. Of course, the 
suspect would not be happy about receiving the subpoena, but from his 
point of view a subpoena has several advantages over a forcible search for 
and seizure of the weapon.176 First, if he does not have the gun, he can so 
state and, if believed by a judge, be relieved of his obligation. Second, if he 
has the gun, he can produce it himself, thereby avoiding the disruption and 
invasion of privacy that would accompany a government effort to search for 
it and seize it. Third, if he has the gun but strongly prefers not to produce it, 
he can refuse to do so and submit to a contempt citation.
In light of all these rights available to the target of a subpoena, it is per-
haps surprising that the suspect nonetheless has a constitutional right not to 
produce the gun. The subpoena clearly constitutes “compulsion” for Fifth 
173. Cf. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (holding that because 
untenured professor had no entitlement to continued employment, he was not entitled to hear-
ing when his contract was not renewed).
174. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) (holding that the government can 
limit persons permitted to engage in business of debt adjusting); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 
348 U.S. 483 (1955) (holding that the government can limit persons entitled to duplicate or 
replace lenses in eye glasses).
175. See, e.g., Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282 (1979) (holding that mother of illegitimate 
children has no entitlement to benefits received by widows and divorced wives of wage earn-
ers); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (holding that there is no entitlement to wel-
fare).
176. Cf. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 573 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (not-
ing that a search warrant, unlike a subpoena, permits ransacking of files “reading each and eve-
ry document until [the police] have found the one named in the warrant”); Max Greenwood, 
Trump Lawyer Labeled Manafort Raid ‘Gross Abuse’: Report, Hill (Aug. 10, 2017, 12:07 PM), 
http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/346047-trump-lawyer-manafort-raid-was-gross-
abuse [https://perma.cc/W4J6-FZCF] (reporting that President Trump’s lawyer called war-
ranted search of Paul Manafort’s home “a gross of abuse of the judicial process” in part because 
of the failure to “exhaust less intrusive methods”).
October 2018] State Action and the Constitution’s Middle Band 35
Amendment purposes.177 It turns out that satisfying the incrimination re-
quirement is somewhat more complicated. Under current doctrine, a court 
would probably hold that the gun itself does not constitute an incriminating 
statement by the defendant.178 By turning over the gun, however, the suspect 
implicitly states that the gun exists and that he has possession of it.179 Unless 
these facts are a “foregone conclusion,” the statements risk incrimination.180
Accordingly, the suspect’s motion to quash the subpoena on self-
incrimination grounds would almost certainly succeed.
Fortunately for the government, though, it need not limit itself to polite 
requests. Under the right circumstances, government agents can break into 
his home at 2:00 a.m.,181 terrify the suspect and his family,182 and, if neces-
sary, destroy the front door and much of the house in the process.183 The 
agents can detain the defendant and other family members, perhaps at gun-
point, perhaps with physical constraints like handcuffs.184 They can then 
ransack the house, searching through desks and dressers, breaking locks, and 
reading private papers.185
It turns out that none of this activity necessarily violates the Self-
Incrimination Clause or indeed any other constitutional provision. None of 
177. See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976) (noting that “[t]he ele-
ments of compulsion are clearly present” in response to subpoena).
178. See id. at 409–10 (holding that papers produced in response to subpoena “cannot be 
said to contain compelled testimonial evidence”).
179. See id. (noting that production of object tacitly concedes the existence of object and 
its control by subject of subpoena).
180. See id. at 411–12 (noting that the existence of the subpoenaed papers was a “fore-
gone conclusion” and their production did not involve testimonial self-incrimination); see also
United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 44 (2000) (production may be testimonial and incrimi-
nating when existence of object produced is not a “foregone conclusion”).
181. See Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430 (1974) (holding no special showing re-
quired for nighttime search). But cf. Hummel-Jones v. Strope, 25 F.3d 647 (8th Cir. 1994) 
(holding 2:00 a.m. raid of small birthing clinic unreasonable under the circumstances).
182. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995) (plurality opinion in part) (holding that 
Fourth Amendment does not establish a “rigid rule” that police must announce their presence 
before entry and that announcement requirement can give way to “countervailing law en-
forcement interests”); cf. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006) (holding that the exclusion-
ary rule does not apply to violation of knock and announce requirements).
183. See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65 (1998) (upholding the right of police 
to destroy property in order to conduct a search); United States v. Weinbender, 109 F.3d 1327 
(8th Cir. 1997) (upholding removal of piece of drywall to conduct search).
184. See Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005) (holding that placing occupants of house in 
handcuffs and detaining them at gun point for two to three hours while house was searched 
was permissible under Fourth Amendment).
185. See, e.g., Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65 (holding that police may destroy property during 
search); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (upholding search of photographic la-
boratories, filing cabinets, desks, and wastepaper baskets in newspaper office); Andresen v. 
Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976) (upholding constitutionality of search taking several hours and 
reading private papers); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (holding that police can 
search house in places where they believe evidence, and not merely contraband is located).
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it “compels” the suspect to incriminate himself. The government’s actions 
are things done to the suspect, not things he is made to do to himself. As the 
Supreme Court has said many times, the Fifth Amendment protects against 
compulsion that incriminates, but not against incrimination itself.186
Moreover, because none of this activity is unconstitutional, the suspect 
is entitled to no compensation even if he is entirely innocent and the gun is 
never found.187 In fact, the uncompensated disruption and destruction of 
property is likely to be more extensive if he is innocent. Police must termi-
nate a search once they find what they are looking for,188 but if the suspect is 
innocent, the police will have to search the entire house before satisfying 
themselves that the gun is not there.189
The contrast to the unconstitutional subpoena process is stark. An inno-
cent suspect confronted with a subpoena can avoid further obligation by as-
serting that he does not possess the gun. He is then entitled to a judicial 
hearing at which the government must prove by clear and convincing evi-
dence that he possesses it.190 An innocent suspect confronted with a search 
has no right to be present when a magistrate issues a warrant, and the gov-
ernment need demonstrate no more than “probable cause” for the warrant to 
186. E.g., Andresen, 427 U.S. at 473–74 (holding that introduction of seized records did 
not violate Fifth Amendment privilege because “petitioner was not asked to say or to do any-
thing”).
187. See, e.g., Porter v. United States, 473 F.2d 1329 (5th Cir. 1973) (taking does not oc-
cur when evidence seized); Eggleston v. Pierce Cty., 64 P.3d 618 (Wash. 2003) (en banc) (hold-
ing no compensable taking when police, pursuant to search warrant, seized load-bearing wall, 
thereby making property uninhabitable).
188. See Andresen, 427 U.S. at 479–80.
189. Of course, the warrant must “particularly” describe the place to be searched, e.g.,
Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927); Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e)(2)(A), but it is clear 
that if there is probable cause to believe that the gun is somewhere in a residence, specification 
of the residence as the unit of search satisfies the particularity requirement. See e.g., Maryland 
v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79 (1987) (upholding warrant authorizing the search of a third floor 
apartment even though, unbeknownst to the police, there were actually two apartments on the 
third floor); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 821 (1982) (“[A] warrant that authorizes an 
officer to search a home for illegal weapons also provides authority to open closets, chests, 
drawers, and containers in which the weapon might be found.”). It does not follow that the 
police can search in places where it is not reasonable to believe that the object they are looking 
for will be, but in the case of a small object like a gun, the scope of the search can be very broad. 
See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 92 F.3d 540, 543 (7th Cir. 1996) (“If they are looking for a ca-
nary’s corpse, they can search a cupboard, but not a locket. If they are looking for an adoles-
cent hippopotamus, they can search the living room or garage but not the microwave oven. If 
they are searching for cocaine, they can search a container large enough to hold a gram, or 
perhaps less.”).
190. See, e.g., SEC v. Hyatt, 621 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir. 2010) (“To prevail on a request for 
a contempt finding, the moving party must establish by clear and convincing evidence that (1) 
a court order sets forth an unambiguous command; (2) the alleged contemnor violated that 
command; (3) the violation was significant, meaning the alleged contemnor did not substan-
tially comply with the order; and (4) the alleged contemnor failed to make a reasonable and 
diligent effort to comply.”).
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issue.191 Once it does, the suspect must stand by and watch as the police tear 
apart all of her possessions looking for a gun that they will never find.
What if the suspect is guilty and does have the gun? A subpoenaed sus-
pect can refuse to produce it and accept the consequences, but the police can 
seize the gun after a search without having to worry about the Self-
Incrimination Clause. One might have thought that if the suspect lawfully
owns the gun, the Constitution’s property protections would prevent gov-
ernment agents from taking it from him. But in fact, so long as the police 
have probable cause to believe that the gun might constitute evidence in a 
criminal case, they are permitted to vitiate his property rights.192
This preference for more aggressive over less aggressive police tactics is 
built into the textual structure of the Fifth Amendment and means that, in 
many cases, the government is less constrained by the Amendment when it 
invades more rights.193 If the police politely ask a motorist whether he has 
been drinking, he has a Fifth Amendment right to refuse to respond even if 
the police have probable cause to believe that he is drunk.194 Denial of that 
right would mean that the defendant had been compelled to incriminate 
himself.195 But if the police with the same probable cause tie the suspect 
down to a table, forcibly stick a needle in his arm to extract his blood, and 
then measure the blood’s alcohol content, the Fifth Amendment loses its 
force.196 Because the motorist is not incriminating himself, he has no right to 
resist.
Bizarrely, the same phenomenon holds when the government enters 
domains that in the pre–New Deal period were thought to be entirely off 
limits. Recall that in the pre–New Deal period, there was a widespread con-
stitutional or quasi-constitutional presumption against government interfer-
ence with private markets.197 But in the modern period, this interference ac-
tually increases the government ability to avoid self-incrimination strictures. 
For example, if the government respects market allocations and leaves busi-
191. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(d)(1) (“After receiving an affidavit or other information, a 
magistrate judge—or if authorized by Rule 41(b), a judge of a state court of record—must issue 
the warrant if there is probable cause to search for and seize a person or property or to install 
and use a tracking device.”).
192. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (holding that police can seize “mere 
evidence” even if not contraband or the fruits or instrumentalities of crime).
193. I do not mean to deny here that there is a certain sense in which the Fifth Amend-
ment invades more rights. If one values the dignitary interest in not being required to be the 
instrument of one’s own destruction, Fifth Amendment compulsion is a special problem. I dis-
cuss this possibility infra in text following note 273.
194. See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990) (plurality opinion in part).
195. See id. at 595–96. I put to one side here the constitutionality of “implied consent”
laws that condition the use of a public highway on consent to tests that measure alcohol levels. 
See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 257.625c(1) (West 2018). For a discussion of how the state 
can avoid Fifth Amendment difficulties by shifting entitlements, see infra notes 252–253 and 
accompanying text.
196. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
197. See supra Section I.B.
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nesses unregulated, a business owner may have a Fifth Amendment privilege 
not to produce his business records.198 If the government instead regulates 
market outcomes by, for example, setting the price at which goods can be 
sold, it can then require the owner to keep records relating to the regulation 
and force the owner to turn over the records even if they incriminate her.199
The same structure applies even to child-rearing, where, as noted 
above,200 a belief in the “natural” allocation of children to parents persists. If 
the government leaves child-rearing in the private sphere, a parent has a 
constitutional right not to provide the government with information that 
might indicate criminal abuse.201 But if the government intervenes more 
forcefully by putting the child under state supervision, the Fifth Amendment 
right evaporates and a parent can be held in contempt for failing to provide 
the information.202
2. Searches and seizures. Similar paradoxes are a pervasive feature of 
Fourth Amendment doctrine. The amendment’s text prohibits “unreasona-
ble” searches and seizures,203 but sometimes a search or seizure becomes 
more reasonable when more privacy and liberty are invaded and when less 
evidence justifies the invasion.
Suppose that the police have a strong hunch that a motorist is driving 
with an expired permit, but the hunch does not amount to reasonable suspi-
cion. Under current doctrine, a police stop of the motorist violates the
Fourth Amendment.204 But suppose that the police have no reason at all to 
suspect wrongdoing and, instead of stopping a single motorist, stop large 
numbers of motorists at a roadblock. These stops invade the privacy and lib-
erty of more people on less evidence. One might suppose that they therefore 
constitute a more serious Fourth Amendment violation. Yet according to 
what Justice Rehnquist has derisively labeled the “misery loves company” 
theory of the Fourth Amendment,205 they are constitutionally permissible.206
198. See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984). The statement in text is subject to 
two qualifications. First, businesses that are partnerships or corporations do not have self-
incrimination rights. See, e.g., Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988) (corporations); Bel-
lis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974) (partnerships). Second, the Fifth Amendment takes hold 
only if the act of production is incriminating. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 
(1976).
199. See Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
200. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
201. See Balt. City Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 561 (1990).
202. See id. at 559–62.
203. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
204. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (requiring at least reasonable sus-
picion to stop an automobile for registration check).
205. Id. at 664 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 663 (majority opinion) (suggesting questioning of “all oncoming traffic at 
roadblock-type stops” as alternative to stops of individuals on less than reasonable suspicion); 
accord Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (upholding similar roadblocks to 
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The Court has applied the same reasoning to validate drug testing of large 
numbers of public school students in the absence of any evidence of wrong-
doing even as it has prohibited searches when a smaller number of students 
is singled out on the basis of some evidence.207 Even odder is the Court’s re-
quirement of “administrative warrants” that can issue without individualized 
probable cause in direct contravention of the Fourth Amendment’s textual 
requirement.208 The very purpose of these warrants is to insure that the gov-
ernment is acting on the basis of a generalized scheme that targets more 
people.209
The Fourth Amendment also has an exception analogous to the Fifth 
Amendment’s required-records exception that limits the necessity for even 
administrative warrants. Before the government can search an unregulated 
business, officials need to obtain a warrant although an administrative war-
rant may be sufficient.210 But by invading more of the private sphere, the 
government can avoid the necessity of obtaining any warrant at all. If the 
government elects to “closely regulate,” the business, then searches are per-
missible without a warrant of any kind.211
A similar anomaly applies to searches of automobiles. The Court has 
held that if the police have probable cause, there is no requirement that they 
obtain a warrant before searching an automobile in part because the gov-
ernment has chosen to heavily regulate automobiles and the expectation of 
privacy in them is therefore reduced.212 It seems to follow that if automobiles 
were less heavily regulated, warrants might be required.
The warrant exception for automobiles does not mean that they can be 
searched without probable cause, but there are other exceptions that some-
times vitiate the probable cause requirement in this context. Under current 
doctrine, if an officer arrests a suspect in or near a car, even for a minor 
crime, the officer may automatically conduct a thorough search of the car’s 
passenger compartment for evidence of the crime of arrest if there is reason 
test for drunk driving). But see City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) (invalidat-
ing roadblock to search for narcotics).
207. Compare Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (upholding drug testing without 
suspicion of large numbers of school children), with New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) 
(prohibiting search of individual school children on less than reasonable suspicion).
208. See See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 541–46 (1967); Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 
U.S. 523, 534 (1967).
209. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 538 (“ ’[P]robable cause’ to issue a warrant to inspect must 
exist if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are 
satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling. Such standards, which will vary with the munici-
pal program being enforced, may be based upon the passage of time, the nature of the building 
(e.g., a multi-family apartment house), or the condition of the entire area, but they will not 
necessarily depend upon specific knowledge of the condition of the particular dwelling.”).
210. See id.
211. See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
212. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1977), abrogated by California v. 
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
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to believe that the evidence will be found.213 But suppose the officer chooses 
to be less aggressive and not arrest the motorist. Then, her right to conduct 
the search evaporates.214 Perversely, the law gives the officer an incentive to 
use more coercion because if she does so, she can avoid otherwise applicable 
Fourth Amendment limits on her actions.215
These cases raise issues about the applicability of the Fourth Amend-
ment’s warrant and probable cause requirements. Those requirements only 
take hold, however, if the government wants to conduct a search or a seizure. 
In recent years, the Court has used a test based upon “reasonable expecta-
tions of privacy” to determine whether there is a search.216 On at least one 
interpretation, this test, too, can be controlled or substantially influenced by 
government activity that restricts the realm of freedom. When positive law 
recognizes privacy rights generally, it often creates a reasonable expectation 
that those rights will be respected. It follows that the police may not selec-
tively violate those rights. But if the government instead chooses not to pro-
tect individuals generally, then those subject to police invasions may lack a 
reasonable expectation of privacy and, so, lose Fourth Amendment protec-
tions.217
Two recent cases have revived a property–physical trespass test for 
searches—an approach previously thought to have been interred by the Su-
preme Court’s landmark decision in Katz v. United States.218 The Court has 
held that the police violated the Fourth Amendment when they attached a 
213. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343–44 (2009).
214. See Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 114 (1998).
215. Of course, the police may not arrest just anyone. In order to exercise their right to 
search incident to arrest, they must have probable cause to arrest. See United States v. Robin-
son, 414 U.S. 218, 227–28 (1973). There is nothing paradoxical about that requirement. What 
is paradoxical—and what produces perverse incentives—is that when the police have probable 
cause, their right to search turns on their taking the more aggressive action of actually effecting 
an arrest.
216. The test is often said to have its roots in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), 
although the phrase itself appears only in Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion. Id. at 360 (Har-
lan, J., concurring). A majority of the justices endorsed the test in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 
(1968).
217. The Court applied something like this test to authorize police aerial surveillance of 
private property in circumstances where the surveillance was not illegal for the general public 
in California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213–14 (1986), and Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 
U.S. 227, 239 (1986). A plurality of the Court reached a similar conclusion in Florida v. Riley,
488 U.S. 445, 449–52 (1989) (plurality opinion), but importantly, the deciding fifth vote, pro-
vided by Justice O’Connor, relied on a test based on what people ordinarily did rather than on 
what the law permitted them to do. Id. at 452–55 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
Since then, the Court has moved toward Justice O’Connor’s approach. See, e.g., Bond v. United 
States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000) (manipulation of bags placed in overhead baggage rack of bus is 
search because passenger does not expect that other passengers or bus employees will engage 
in this conduct). For a defense of the positive law approach, see Baude & Stern, supra note 4.
218. 389 U.S. at 353 (“[T]he reach of [the Fourth] Amendment cannot turn upon the 
presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure.”).
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GPS device to the bottom of the suspect’s car without first securing a valid 
warrant.219 Similarly, it held that the police violated the Fourth Amendment 
when officers walked up to the suspect’s house with a drug sniffing dog.220 In 
both cases, the holdings rested on the fact that the police activity constituted 
a physical trespass onto private property.
When the trespass test was first announced, it operated against the 
backdrop assumption that property rights were themselves fixed by constitu-
tional command. The test therefore fit easily within the two-band schema. 
Searches were defined by property rights, which themselves were determined 
by whether public action impermissibly infringed on a naturalized private 
sphere.
Remnants of this world remain, especially with respect to real property. 
But in the modern regulatory context, many property entitlements find their 
source in discretionary state law.221 For example, states might or might not 
recognize a license for private individuals to approach the front door of a 
house.222 With respect to entitlements like these, the trespass analysis has 
radically different implications. If the state does nothing at all, private 
searches fail the conventional state action test. If the state acts aggressively by 
recognizing a private license and thereby restricting the homeowner’s prop-
erty right, it is similarly unconstrained by the Fourth Amendment’s com-
mands. But if the state is in the middle band by recognizing the homeown-
er’s property right but nonetheless permitting its invasion when the police 
introduce a drug-sniffing dog onto the property, then the Fourth Amend-
ment takes hold.
It turns out, then, that in a wide variety of circumstances, the extent of 
Fourth and Fifth Amendment constraints turns on the band within which 
the state is operating. If the state does nothing—if there is no “state action” 
that compels an individual to speak or invades his reasonable expectation of 
privacy—constitutional protections fail to take hold. But these protections 
are also unavailable if the state acts aggressively by, for example, retaining for 
itself an entitlement, declining to recognize property rights, or searching 
large groups of people. The Constitution matters most when the state oper-
219. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406–07 (2012) (arguing that “Katz did not re-
pudiate” the original understanding of the Fourth Amendment as “embody[ing] a particular 
concern for government trespass”).
220. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 5–6 (2013) (holding that when government obtains 
information by personally intruding on persons, houses, papers or effects, it has conducted a 
“search” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment).
221. See, e.g., Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 160 n.10 (1978) (noting that property 
“is not a monolithic, abstract concept hovering in the legal stratosphere. It is a bundle of rights 
in personalty, the metes and bounds of which are determined by the decisional and statutory 
law of the State”).
222. Compare Jardines, 569 U.S. at 16 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The law of trespass general-
ly gives members of the public a license to use a walkway to approach the front door of a house 
and to remain there for a brief time.”), with id. at 9 (majority opinion) (“The scope of a li-
cense—express or implied—is limited not only to a particular area but also to a specific pur-
pose.”).
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ates in the middle band by restraining itself in some ways (by, for example, 
recognizing a property right, providing for private entitlements, or restrict-
ing the numbers of people searched) but not in others (by, for example, 
compelling individuals to incriminate themselves or searching or seizing 
them).
E. The Fourteenth Amendment
1. Equal protection. Equal protection doctrine is haunted by a well-
known two-way-ratchet problem. The state can provide equal protection ei-
ther by extending benefits to people who don’t have them or by taking them 
away from people who do. If the state chooses the latter option, how is any-
one made better off? Many commentators have noticed the problem,223 but 
no one (to my knowledge) has seen its connection to the middle band phe-
nomenon.
Sessions v. Morales-Santana224 provides a useful example. Immigration 
law makes it easier for the child of an unwed American mother to obtain cit-
izenship than for the child of an unwed American father.225 The Court held 
that this discrimination violated the Equal Protection Clause.226 One might 
have supposed that this holding would result in relief for the children of un-
wed American fathers, and indeed, this solution would remedy the equal 
protection problem. By receding from its discriminatory treatment, the gov-
ernment would be doing less and, therefore, escape constitutional difficul-
ties. But, perhaps surprisingly, the Court held that the problem should be 
remedied by the government acting more forcefully.227 Instead of merely re-
stricting the citizenship rights of children of unwed fathers, the Court’s deci-
sion required the government to restrict the rights of children of unwed 
mothers as well.228
The point is generalizable. When government action is challenged on 
equality grounds, constitutional law is indifferent as between a resolution 
that extends benefits to a broader class or a resolution that deprives a broad-
er class of the benefits.229 This means that it is always at least theoretically 
223. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96 
Mich. L. Rev. 2001, 2027 (1998); Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Pun-
ishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1388, 1436 (1988); Peter Westen, The 
Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 537 (1982).
224. 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017).
225. See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (2012).
226. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1679.
227. Id. at 1686.
228. Id.
229. While “[t]he general assumption in contemporary equal protection law . . . is 
that . . . the state will remedy the inequality by providing the benefit to the previously excluded 
group . . . rather than by depriving the previously included group,” Karlan, supra note 223, at 
2027, the ultimate touchstone is the supposed intent of Congress. The Court looks to “the in-
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open to the government to resolve an equality problem by making things 
worse for a larger group. Suppose, for example, that capital punishment was 
successfully challenged on the ground that it was administered in a fashion 
that discriminated against African Americans. This constitutional problem 
could be resolved by more executions of people identified as belonging to 
other races.230 Put differently, the Constitution applies only to a middle 
band, where some people are harmed but not others. The government has a 
choice of avoiding the constitutional difficulty by opting for either the inner 
band (where it acts less aggressively and harms fewer people) or the outer 
band (where it acts more aggressively and harms more people).
Some judges and commentators have thought that this feature of equali-
ty doctrine actually makes it more attractive. For example, Justice Jackson 
once argued that judicial enforcement of the Equal Protection Clause was 
more respectful of the political branches than due process enforcement be-
cause, instead of altogether prohibiting the government from acting, it per-
mitted government intervention so long as it acted equally with respect to a 
larger group of people.231 More recently, Justice Scalia has offered a similar 
argument.232 Moreover, it is often true that when the government is put to 
the hard choice, it will make things better for everyone rather than worse for 
everyone.233 Although the Morales-Santana plaintiffs lost in the short run, 
they can hope that if they are patient, Congress will eventually remedy the 
problem by extending benefits to a broader group.
This positive outcome, if it occurs, may vindicate the Jackson and Scalia 
view. In the next Part, I address more generally the normative case for and 
against the middle band structure. For present purposes, the important point 
is that the argument amounts to a defense of this structure. Both Jackson and 
Scalia thought it was a virtue that equal protection jurisprudence, like much 
of the rest of constitutional law, permits the government to satisfy constitu-
tional commands by doing either more or less.234
tensity of commitment to the residual policy and consider[s] the degree of potential disruption
of the statutory scheme that would occur by extension as opposed to abrogation.” Heckler v. 
Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 739 n.5 (1984) (quoting Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 365 
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in the result)).
230. See Kennedy, supra note 223, at 1436 (discussing “leveling up” solution).
231. Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J., concur-
ring) (“Invocation of the equal protection clause . . . does not disable any governmental body 
from dealing with the subject at hand. It merely means that the prohibition or regulation must 
have a broader impact.”).
232. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 300 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(“Our salvation is the Equal Protection Clause, which requires the democratic majority to ac-
cept for themselves and their loved ones what they impose on you and me.”).
233. But see Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (refusing to extend benefit to excluded 
class in light of equal protection violation).
234. Jackson and Scalia had somewhat different reasons for favoring the middle band 
solution. For Jackson, writing in the immediate wake of the fight over judicial restraint associ-
ated with the rejection of the Lochner approach, equal protection was preferable to due process 
because equal protection provided the political branches with more flexibility. See Ry. Express 
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2. Procedural due process. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause prohibits deprivations of life, liberty, or property without due process 
of law.235 The modern Court has interpreted the procedural branch of this 
guarantee as requiring some sort of hearing that allows a person threatened 
with the deprivation of a property or liberty right the opportunity to contest 
the factual basis for that deprivation.236 This requirement, however, applies 
only to middle band cases. As DeShaney illustrates, if the government does 
less—if it merely allows a private person to deprive the victim of life, liberty, 
or property—the clause is inapplicable.237 But it turns out it is also inapplica-
ble if the government does more.
First, consider deprivations of property. In the pre–New Deal period,
when property law was thought to be prepolitical, outer band cases were sub-
ject to constitutional constraints.238 Today, as noted above, the Court has 
recognized that many property rights have their roots in positive law.239 It 
follows that the state can avoid procedural due process constraints by elimi-
nating the property right.
Flagg Bros. v. Brooks provides an example of how the inner and outer 
bands can work in tandem to deny constitutional protection.240 When 
Brooks was evicted from her apartment, the city marshal arranged for stor-
age of her possessions in a warehouse owned by Flagg Brothers.241 Flagg 
Brothers claimed that Brooks had failed to pay for the storage and threat-
ened to sell the possessions.242 It relied on a state statute providing that a 
warehouseman could satisfy a lien on goods in his possession by selling 
them.243 Brooks then sued, claiming that she was entitled to a hearing before 
the goods were sold.244
Agency, 336 U.S. at 112 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“Invocation of the equal protection 
clause . . . does not disable any governmental body from dealing with the subject at hand. It 
merely means that the prohibition or regulation must have a broader impact.”). For Scalia, 
writing in an age where process-based and “representation reinforcement” theories were influ-
ential, equal protection was preferable to due process because of equal protection’s capacity to 
generate political checks on government excess. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 300 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (“Our salvation is the Equal Protection Clause, which requires the democratic majority to 
accept for themselves and their loved ones what they impose on you and me.”). For a discus-
sion of each of these justifications, see infra Section III.B.2.
235. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
236. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (collecting 
cases).
237. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
238. See supra Section I.B.
239. See supra Section I.B.
240. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
241. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 153.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 156.
244. Id. at 153–54.
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The Supreme Court rejected Brooks’s claim. Flagg Brothers’s sale of the 
goods was within the inner band. It was action by a private party that the 
state had no obligation to control.245 But what of the statute that authorized 
the sale? As the Court recognized, the statute effectively modified the prop-
erty rights that respondent had before the warehouseman gained possession 
of the property.246 But, remarkably, instead of being an argument in Brooks’s 
favor, this doomed her case. According to the Court, “[t]he validity of the 
property interest in these possessions . . . depends on New York law.”247 The 
statutory declaration that Brooks lacked the right to prevent the sale was un-
doubtedly state action in the conventional sense, but it was state action in the 
outer band and therefore free from constitutional scrutiny.
Cases involving government employment also illustrate how the outer 
band works. In Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, a government 
employee who had been discharged complained that he was not provided 
with constitutionally adequate procedures to rebut the charges against 
him.248 Under state law, the employee could be terminated only “for cause,” 
but the same statute specified the procedures to be utilized to determine 
whether the “for cause” standard had been met.249 The employer argued that 
whatever property interest the employee had was defined by state law, which 
included the specification of procedures, but the Court rejected this argu-
ment.250 In the Court’s view, accepting the state’s argument would “reduce
[due process] to a mere tautology.”251
It follows that the state cannot put itself in the outer band simply by an-
nouncing in advance that it will not provide the procedures that the Due 
Process Clause otherwise requires. It does not follow, however, that the outer 
band is unavailable. The state can achieve its objective by shifting the enti-
tlement in much the way that it can defeat self-incrimination claims.252 If the 
state declines to create a property interest in employment, then the Due Pro-
cess Clause loses force. For example, if the state specifies that an employee 
can be discharged at will, then the employee has no property interest in the 
job and no procedures are required.253 By more aggressively restricting an 
245. The Court emphasized that the respondents “have named no public officials as de-
fendants” and that there was a “total absence of overt official involvement” in the sale. Id. at 
157.
246. Id. at 161 n.11 (noting that New York had “enacted a statute which provides that a 
warehouseman conforming to the provisions of the statute may convert his traditional lien into 
good title”).
247. Id. at 160 n.10.
248. 470 U.S. 532, 535–38 (1985).
249. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 539 n.6.
250. Id. at 539–41.
251. Id. at 541.
252. See supra Section II.D.1.
253. Compare Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602–03 (1972) (holding that an em-
ployee with “a legitimate claim of entitlement to job tenure” has a right to a hearing), with Bd. 
of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 578 (1972) (holding that an employee whose 
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employee’s substantive rights, the state is permitted to extinguish his proce-
dural rights as well.
Whereas the modern Court has insisted that property rights are a crea-
ture of state law, it continues to recognize “natural” liberty and life inter-
ests.254 No one supposes that the government could make people free from 
imprisonment or death only “at will” and thereby avoid the necessity of 
criminal trials. Still, something like the same technique can put even crimi-
nal cases within the outer band. Suppose that the government makes it a 
criminal offense to provide material aid to any terrorist organization. In a 
criminal trial, the defendant would have a constitutional right to contest 
whether the organization she aided fit the statutory definition of “terrorist.”
But if the legislature itself specifies the organizations or delegates the specifi-
cation to administrative officials and then outlaws giving material aid to the 
organizations so specified,255 the defendant loses her procedural rights.256 So 
long as it satisfies other constitutional requirements and acts rationally, 
Congress can define criminal conduct based upon its own determination of 
facts.257 It follows that when Congress is more aggressive in asserting its leg-
islative power, it reduces the number of facts that are relevant to the contro-
versy and, so, shrinks the domain of procedural protection.258
To summarize and generalize the point: procedural rights are always 
parasitic on substantive rights. An individual has a right to a hearing only 
with respect to facts that as a substantive matter are relevant to the dispute. 
The state may avoid its procedural duties by making the facts irrelevant—
that is, by diminishing the substantive rights that the individual enjoys. Be-
cause the state has acted more aggressively, the individual has fewer consti-
tutional protections.
appointment “secured absolutely no interest in re-employment. . . . did not have a property
interest sufficient to require University authorities to give him a hearing”).
254. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224 (2005) (recognizing liberty interest 
not grounded in positive state law); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494 (1980) (same).
255. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2012) makes it a criminal offense to “know-
ingly provide[] material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization.” Id. 
§ 2339B(g)(6) defines “terrorist organization” as “an organization designated as a terrorist or-
ganization under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.”
256. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 120–21 (1989) (plurality opinion) 
(holding that when statute irrebuttably presumes facts to be true, procedural due process rights 
are not violated).
257. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–54 (1938) (“[W]e 
recognize that the constitutionality of a statute, valid on its face, may be assailed by proof of 
facts tending to show that the statute as applied to a particular article is without support in rea-
son . . . . But by their very nature such inquiries, where the legislative judgment is drawn in 
question, must be restricted to the issue whether any state of facts either known or which could 
reasonably be assumed affords support for it.”).
258. Cf. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (holding that due process is not vio-
lated when state makes defendant bear burden of proving “affirmative defenses”).
October 2018] State Action and the Constitution’s Middle Band 47
3. Substantive due process. One might suppose that the techniques de-
scribed above would not work when the Due Process Clause protects sub-
stantive rights. These rights, by definition, are not subject to state modifica-
tion, and the state therefore cannot place itself in the outer band by the 
simple expedient of refusing the recognize them. But the tripartite structure 
sometimes reemerges when the state makes conditional offers concerning 
substantive rights.
Consider, for example, Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management 
District.259 The law required a landowner to obtain state permits before de-
veloping his land.260 Neither party disputed that the government could have 
taken the more intrusive action of simply denying the permits. Instead, the 
government indicated that it would grant the permits if the landowner took 
certain actions to mitigate the environmental damage that the development 
would cause.261 Remarkably, the Court held that this less intrusive offer
might make the government’s actions unconstitutional.262 This was true even 
though the penalty for rejecting the offer—the denial of the permits—would 
have been constitutionally unproblematic if the offer had never been made.
Cases involving statutes that limit benefits when the recipient exercises a 
constitutional right have a similar structure. Suppose that a poor woman is 
unable to pay for an abortion. If the state provides no subsidies of any kind 
for healthcare, the case is in the inner band. The state has merely failed to 
act, and the woman’s inability to terminate her pregnancy is attributable to 
private forces to which the Constitution does not speak.263 If instead the state 
intervenes aggressively by providing extensive subsidies for abortions as well
as for other services, it is in the outer band. Under current doctrine, state 
“distortion” of abortion markets violates no one’s rights.
But suppose that the state generally provides extensive subsidies for a 
variety of medical services but refuses to provide any of the subsidies (in-
cluding those unrelated to childbirth) to women who have abortions. In a 
certain sense, these women are no worse off than they would be if the state 
provided no medical subsidies for anyone. If market pressures do not count 
as state coercion when the government subsidizes no one, one might wonder 
how they become coercive when it subsidizes some but not others. Yet the 
Court has strongly suggested that cutting off all benefits to women who se-
259. 570 U.S. 595 (2013).
260. Koontz, 570 U.S. at 600–01.
261. Id. at 600–02.
262. Id. at 619. The Court remanded the case to the Florida Supreme Court to determine 
whether the requirements of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), and 
Dolan v. Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994), had been met. Koontz, 570 U.S. at 619.
263. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980) (“The financial constraints that re-
strict an indigent woman’s ability to enjoy the full range of constitutionally protected freedom 
of choice are the product not of governmental restrictions on access to abortions, but rather of 
her indigency.”); cf. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471 (1977) (noting that financial need alone 
does not identify a suspect class for equal protection purposes).
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cure abortions violates their substantive due process rights.264 True, the state 
does not have to fund abortions themselves, but failure to fund unrelated 
medical care because a woman chooses abortion unconstitutionally pres-
sures the abortion right.
I do not mean to suggest that this distinction is incoherent or even para-
doxical. There may well be sound reasons for making it265—reasons that I 
explore in the next Parts. As a descriptive matter, however, the distinction 
provides yet another example of state action’s tripartite structure. In our ex-
ample, the state has not been entirely passive by funding nothing, but neither 
has it been entirely active by funding everything. Only when it occupies the 
middle space by funding some things but not others does constitutional ob-
ligation take hold.
III. Explanations and Justifications: Disaggregation
What explains the tripartite structure? There is no reason to assume a 
priori that there is a grand, unified theory that accounts for all the results. 
Individual outcomes may stem from the force of text, doctrinal path de-
pendence, pragmatic concerns, or even idiosyncratic actions by individual 
justices. More broadly, the results might be explained by strands of general 
constitutional theory that have nothing to do with state action or the demar-
cation of private, public, and mixed spheres. In this Part, I explore these pos-
sibilities. In the next Part, I suggest ways in which these seemingly disparate 
justifications might nonetheless be linked to the modern state action prob-
lem.
A. Textual Explanations
Some of the anomalies described above seem to be linked to the fact that 
different constitutional provisions unsurprisingly produce different results. 
For example, the difference between the government’s subpoena and search 
powers266 might be taken to prove no more than that the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments impose different textual requirements. Perhaps in some sense 
264. See Maher, 432 U.S. at 474 n.8 (“If Connecticut denied general welfare benefits to all 
women who had obtained abortions and who were otherwise entitled to the benefits . . . strict 
scrutiny might be appropriate . . . .”); cf. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984) 
(striking down law prohibiting any station that accepted government funds for editorializing 
even if the editorializing was not paid for by government funds).
265. For some well-known suggestions of reasons, see Richard A. Epstein, Bargaining 
with the State (1993); Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional 
Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 Geo. L.J. 1 (2001); and Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanc-
tions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1293, 1304 (1984).
266. See supra Section II.D.
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a subpoena is less invasive than a search,267 but in another sense, the cases 
are simply not comparable. The Fourth and Fifth Amendments deal with 
different evils that are not readily measurable against each other. It is there-
fore not unsurprising that they yield different requirements.
Similarly, the distinction between the ACA and a purely public 
healthcare system268 can be explained on the ground that the programs’ legit-
imacy depends on different heads of power: The ACA’s proponents justified 
it as an exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause powers. A fully public 
healthcare system would be justified under Congress’s taxing and spending 
powers. The fact that a particular program fails when justified under one 
source of power says nothing about whether a different program should fail 
under a different source of power.269
Even when we are making intraclause comparisons, some results seem 
to be dictated by constitutional text. For better or worse, it is simply a fact 
that the Fourteenth Amendment protects equality. As others have argued,270
the equality norm can produce counterintuitive results, but arguments based 
on those results demonstrate only that the equality requirement is contro-
versial. Constitutional drafters might want to think hard about whether they 
should insert the guarantee into the text. But once it is there, the anomalies it 
produces are no more than a consequence of their choice.
B. General Constitutional Theories
In other cases, paradoxical outcomes are less tied to the force of consti-
tutional text, but it does not follow that they are necessarily related to the 
state action problem. For example, there is nothing in the text or history of 
the Fourth Amendment that suggests that the Amendment’s requirements 
should be diluted when more people are searched for less reason. Nor does a 
straightforward reading of the Commerce Clause yield the conclusion that 
states should be freed from the Clause’s negative implications when they op-
erate a business on their own. Still, these outcomes might relate to one or 
more general theories of constitutional law with normative justifications un-
related to the state action problem. This Section discusses several of these 
theories.
267. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 573 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“A
search, unlike a subpoena, will . . . lead to the needless exposure of confidential information 
completely unrelated to the purpose of the investigation.”).
268. See supra Introduction.
269. Cf. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 547–71 (2012) (opinion of 
Roberts, C.J. in part and majority opinion in part) (finding that the Affordable Care Act ex-
ceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause powers but that it was a constitutionally permissible ex-
ercise of its taxing powers).
270. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare 444–49
(2002) (“A welfare economic evaluation would not . . . accord weight to equality if doing so 
would make individuals worse off, and we do not find in the literature a basis for rejecting this 
prescription.”); Westen, supra note 223, at 542 (“Equality . . . is an idea that should be banished 
from moral and legal discourse as an explanatory norm.”).
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1. Protection of dignity. Some of the outcomes described above are at-
tributable to a concern about a particular conception of dignity271 and with a 
privileging of this conception over a particular conception of freedom. When 
the government does unwanted things to individuals against their will, it in-
vades freedom, but at least some people think that an independent and per-
haps greater harm occurs when the government forces or tempts individuals 
to use their will to do things to themselves.272 A person who is incarcerated 
loses his freedom, but no one supposes that, say, Nelson Mandela lost his 
dignity when he was jailed against his will. Dignity is at risk only if the pris-
oner’s will is coopted for purposes of the state. A prisoner made to grovel, to 
beg for forgiveness, or to admit his guilt has lost something important that is 
not captured by the idea of freedom.273
A preference for dignity over freedom sometimes explains the distinc-
tion between the middle and outer bands. It lies at the heart of the Self-
Incrimination Clause. There are many explanations for the clause, but per-
haps the most persuasive relies on the intuition that even though the state 
has the authority to deprive people of freedom, it lacks the authority to force 
people to implicate themselves in their own subjugation.274 The state can do 
things to people, but it should not undermine their status as independent 
choosing and resisting agents, at least when it imposes a criminal sanction. It 
follows that, for example, the state violates the Self-Incrimination Clause 
when it forces a person to turn over a gun by an exercise of her will, but not 
when it takes the gun from her against her will.
Some First Amendment decisions that free the government from consti-
tutional constraints when it operates in the outer band rest on a similar intu-
ition. When the government builds a road through sacred tribal lands, it un-
questionably harms those who believe the lands to be sacred, but at least the 
271. The conception that I describe here is not one of the conceptions that are most often 
described and defended in the literature. For important, different conceptions, see Martha 
Nussbaum, Human Dignity and Political Entitlements, in Human Dignity and Bioethics 351 
(2008), and Neomi Rao, Three Concepts of Dignity in Constitutional Law, 86 Notre Dame L. 
Rev. 183 (2011).
272. Cf. Oscar Schachter, Editorial Comment, Human Dignity as a Normative Concept,
77 Am. J. Int’l L. 848, 852 (1983) (asserting that human dignity is violated by “[p]sychiatric 
treatment that involves coercive means to change beliefs or choices that are lawful”).
273. Although his discussion is deeply problematic for other reasons, see Louis Michael 
Seidman, The Triumph of Gay Marriage and the Failure of Constitutional Law, 2015 Sup. Ct. 
Rev. 115, 120–21 (criticizing Thomas’s dignity argument), Justice Thomas may have had 
something like this conception in mind when he wrote that “[s]laves did not lose their dignity 
(any more than they lost their humanity) because the government allowed them to be enslaved. 
Those held in internment camps did not lose their dignity because the government confined 
them. And those denied governmental benefits certainly do not lose their dignity because the 
government denies them those benefits.” Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2639 (2015) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
274. See, e.g., Diane Marie Amann, A Whipsaw Cuts Both Ways: The Privilege Against 
Self-Incrimination in an International Context, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1201, 1287 (1998).
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harm is not self-inflicted.275 If American Indians are bribed to give up the 
land, they may find themselves alienated from their own beliefs. Providing 
them with the choice to accept the bribe gives them more freedom but risks 
their dignity. Similarly, the freedom of smokers would undoubtedly be in-
fringed if the government outlawed cigarettes, but a different, perhaps more 
serious, interest is infringed if the government permits sale and possession of 
cigarettes but uses its control over speech to manipulate the will of prospec-
tive smokers.276
It may seem strange to worry about the dignity of institutions rather 
than individuals, but something like this idea also lies behind the Court’s
otherwise puzzling federalism and separation of powers decisions. Prohibi-
tion on commandeering, on “coercive offers” directed toward the states, and 
on congressional control of executive officers seem to rest on a concern 
about dignity rather than a concern about freedom.277 For example, the fed-
eral government can invade the state’s domain of freedom by operating in 
the outer band. It does so by completely preempting the field and enacting 
its own regulations that, under the Supremacy Clause, bind the states.278
Similarly, Congress is free to legislate in the outer band when it passes stat-
utes countermanding executive agency rules and regulating the activity it-
self.279 But the federal government cannot impinge on the dignity of states by 
forcing states to cooperate,280 and Congress cannot impinge on the dignity of 
the executive branch by controlling executive officers.281 Middle band cases 
that preserve more freedom for the state or agency officials are nonetheless 
constitutionally vulnerable because they involve the kind of co-optation that 
is inconsistent with dignity.
Finally, both Walker and Sebelius reflect the shift from freedom to digni-
ty. On this theory, the “government speech” category is immune from con-
stitutional review because when the government speaks, it is not implicating 
the individual in its message in the same way it would be if it forced the indi-
vidual to speak. Similarly, if the government nationalized healthcare markets 
and taxed individuals to pay for the program, the domain of market freedom 
would be restricted, but individual dignity would remain intact. People 
would be less free in the sense that they would be forced into a healthcare re-
275. See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
276. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 518 (1996) (Thomas, J., con-
curring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“In cases . . . in which the government’s as-
serted interest is to keep legal users of a product or service ignorant in order to manipulate 
their choices in the marketplace, [the government] ‘interest’ is per se illegitimate . . . .”).
277. See Scott Dodson, Dignity: The New Frontier of State Sovereignty, 56 Okla. L. Rev. 
777 (2003).
278. See supra notes 111–112 and accompanying text.
279. See Frederick M. Kaiser, Congressional Action to Overturn Agency Rules: Alternatives 
to the “Legislative Veto,” 32 Admin. L. Rev. 667, 670–73 (1980) (collecting examples of Con-
gress overturning or preempting federal agency rules).
280. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Dodson, supra note 277, at 827–28.
281. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138–39 (1976).
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gime that they opposed. They would not, however, be made to cooperate 
with that regime as they would be if the government operated in the middle 
band by requiring them to purchase goods they did not want.
2. Politically imposed benchmarks. Some outer band cases result from 
courts holding the political branches to standards that the political branches 
themselves have established. Equal protection cases provide the clearest illus-
tration of this approach. The government is not required to establish any 
particular substantive standard, but when it establishes a standard, it is obli-
gated to apply it consistently across cases that are relevantly similar. A neces-
sary consequence of this approach is that the government can avoid equal 
protection condemnation by establishing a different substantive standard 
that, when faithfully applied, disadvantages more people.
Something like this idea may lie behind equality requirements for other 
constitutional rights. Within very broad constraints, the government can es-
tablish standards for, say, outdoor fires or the slaughtering of animals, but 
when it writes special rules for flag burners282 or minority religions,283 it is 
violating its self-given general rules.
Other self-imposed benchmarks are unrelated to equality. Consider, for 
example, the required-records exception to the Self-Incrimination Clause,284
the heavily regulated industry285 and automobile exceptions286 to the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant requirement, and the mandatory procedural protec-
tions dependent on discretionary government entitlements.287 The bench-
marks in these cases are formed by the government’s own regulatory deci-
sions, but the cases do not seem to be about equality. They are better 
explained by the intuition that individuals who know the benchmarks in ad-
vance and make “voluntary” decisions based on them have nothing to com-
plain about when the previously announced rules are applied to them.288
Finally, in some cases, the benchmark satisfies constitutional require-
ments because it is perceived to be the product of more general societal 
norms. For example, individuals sometimes lose their Fourth Amendment 
expectation of privacy when the statutes permit private conduct analogous to 
282. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 
(1989).
283. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)
(plurality opinion in part).
284. See Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
285. See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987); Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 
U.S. 307 (1978).
286. See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991); Carroll v. United States, 267 
U.S. 132 (1925).
287. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
288. Cf., e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (plurality opinion) (holding that 
a person contemplating illegal activities assumes the risk that his companions will report ac-
tivity to police). I am bracketing here the obvious problem of defining “voluntariness” in this 
context.
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the challenged government activity.289 Similarly, the government can evade 
First Amendment protections for commercial speech by prohibiting the un-
derlying conduct.290 In these cases, there is a sense in which the government 
is less restrained when it acts more vigorously. But that result seems less par-
adoxical if one thinks that the government action itself is constrained by 
prevailing social norms. Yes, the government could prohibit advertisements 
for intoxicating beverages if it outlawed consumption of the beverages, but 
as a practical matter, contemporary social norms make an outright ban polit-
ically infeasible. Norms like these impede the government from readily mov-
ing to the outer band, and perhaps that is constraint enough.
3. Systemic regulation: Impermissible purpose. In many instances, the 
outer band phenomenon seems to result from the Court’s concern with sys-
temic malfunction rather than with individual oppression. Instead of worry-
ing about whether a particular individual has suffered a rights violation, the 
court might focus its attention on institutional or systemic problems that 
risk rights violations over a range of cases. Sometimes, this concern leads to 
an investigation of the general purpose of legislation rather than to a focus 
on its impact on particular individuals.
Consider, for example, the preoccupation with content neutrality in free 
speech doctrine. As already noted, the content-neutrality requirement can 
have the effect of decreasing First Amendment scrutiny when more individ-
uals lose a speech opportunity.291 Whereas a content-based restriction harms 
only speakers with certain messages, a content-neutral restriction targets a 
broader group.
But this result is perverse only if one assumes that the purpose of the ex-
ercise is to police individual outcomes rather than the process by which the 
outcomes are reached. Content-based restrictions are suspect because they 
lead to the inference that an impermissible purpose has polluted the pro-
cess.292 If the government permits speech with particular content while pro-
hibiting other speech with different content, then perhaps the reason for the 
regulation is the desire to suppress the disfavored speech, rather than to 
achieve goals that are not speech related.
289. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450 (1989) (plurality opinion) (holding that 
government overflights of backyard did not invade reasonable expectation of privacy because 
FAA regulations did not prohibit them for private persons).
290. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
771–72 (1976).
291. See supra Section II.C.1.
292. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 
502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991) (“[T]he government’s ability to impose content-based burdens on 
speech raises the specter that the government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints 
from the marketplace.”); Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmen-
tal Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 413, 414 (1996) (“If a court were to 
attempt to devise easily manageable rules for ferreting out impermissible governmental mo-
tives in the First Amendment context, it first would create a distinction between speech regula-
tions that are content neutral and those that are content based.”).
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It is true that particular individuals whose speech is banned may well be 
indifferent to the reasons for suppression. People prohibited from using 
sound trucks to broadcast radical messages are equally prohibited from 
speaking whether regulators are motivated by a desire to reduce noise or op-
position to the speech’s content.293 But if the concern is with distortion of the 
overall process rather than with individual outcomes, the motivation may be 
crucial. To the extent that ideas are in competition with each other, content-
based restrictions may give one set of ideas an unfair advantage.294 Even if 
the ideas are not in competition, discouraging content-based regulation 
changes the baseline from which harm is measured.
To see the latter point, suppose first that the choice is between content 
based and content-neutral regulation. From the regulator’s perspective, the 
objective of suppressing the unwanted speech can be achieved at less cost 
with a content-based restriction. If we put aside cases where ideas are in 
competition, the disadvantaged speaker will be indifferent as between a 
broader or narrower prohibition. Either way, he is prohibited from speaking. 
From both perspectives, then, a narrower prohibition dominates.
But now suppose that we take content-based prohibitions off the table. 
In this world, the regulator must choose between no regulation at all and 
regulation that restricts speakers who are not his target. If his concern is with 
nonspeech related costs, he might well prefer the broader ban, in which case 
the disadvantaged speaker is still no better off. But if the regulator is moti-
vated by opposition to the speech, he might prefer no prohibition at all to a 
prohibition that reaches speech he favors. Forcing a choice between no regu-
lation and content-neutral regulation might move the regulatory regime 
from the middle to the inner band, thereby benefiting the disadvantaged 
speaker.
Something like this phenomenon is present in many other cases where 
state action has a tripartite structure. In many equal protection cases, for ex-
ample, the hope is that if the government is forced to choose between the 
outer and inner band, it will select the inner band.295 Yes, faced with the re-
quirement that they enforce the death penalty in an even-handed fashion, 
there is a risk that officials will choose to execute more people, but perhaps it 
is more likely that they will choose to execute fewer people.
Otherwise paradoxical Fourth Amendment doctrine that provides less 
protection when more people are searched or seized rests on similar assump-
tions. If the police cannot single out individual motorists to stop on less-
293. Cf. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 113 (1972) (“[A]ntinoise ordinance 
does not permit punishment for the expression of an unpopular point of view, and it contains 
no broad invitation to subjective or discriminatory enforcement.”).
294. See David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality 
in Government-Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 675, 702–08 (1992).
295. See supra note 229.
October 2018] State Action and the Constitution’s Middle Band 55
than-reasonable suspicion, they might instead establish roadblocks and 
search everyone. But they might also forego the stops altogether.
Finally, this analysis also explains the “prediction” approach to uncon-
stitutional condition cases.296 Suppose the government offers to grant a de-
velopment permit if the developer will agree to mitigate environmental dam-
ages.297 If the government would otherwise deny the permit, and if the denial 
is legally permissible, then it is hard to see how the developer is made worse 
off by the offer. But suppose we predict that the government would grant the 
permit if it were barred from making the offer. Then, it is easy to see how its 
ability to make the offer leaves the developer worse off.
4. Systemic regulation: Representation reinforcement. The argument from 
improper motivation is closely tied to John Hart Ely’s famous defense of 
what he called “representation reinforcement.”298 Ely’s core idea was that 
otherwise vague or ambiguous constitutional language could be given con-
tent without the problematic judicial value judgments that Lochner critics 
abhorred. Judges could eschew substantive value specification while rein-
forcing the procedural values of democratic self-government. Because value 
judgments should be left to the political process, courts acted appropriately 
when they policed the process to root out undemocratic defects.299
Perhaps Ely’s most important contribution was to elaborate on an older 
idea that prejudice against “discrete and insular minorities” was at the root 
of one such defect.300 When this prejudice prevented minority groups from 
forming coalitions to protect their interests, they lacked fair representation 
in the pluralist, political marketplace. Judicial intervention to prevent dis-
crimination against them was therefore not an insistence on contestable val-
ues. Instead, it did no more than correct a representational defect.301
Many otherwise paradoxical outer band cases can be explained by a the-
ory along these lines. The cases seem paradoxical because constitutional pro-
visions designed to limit government power lose their force when the gov-
ernment exercises power more aggressively. Fourth Amendment searches 
are less problematic when more people are searched, First Amendment re-
strictions are less severe when more people are silenced, and the death penal-
ty is more legitimate when more people are killed.
296. See Kreimer, supra note 265, at 1371–74.
297. Cf. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595 (2013).
298. See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 
77–87 (1980) (arguing for a “participation-oriented, representation-reinforcing approach to 
judicial review”) [hereinafter Ely, Democracy and Distrust]. On the intersection between 
representation reinforcement and improper motive analysis, see John Hart Ely, Legislative and 
Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 Yale L.J. 1205 (1970).
299. See Ely, Democracy and Distrust, supra note 298, at 103.
300. See id. (elaborating on United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 
(1938)).
301. Id. For well-known critiques, see Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 
Harv. L. Rev. 713 (1985); Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Consti-
tutional Theories, 89 Yale L.J. 1063 (1980).
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What these outer band cases actually demonstrate is that there is some-
times a tension between concepts of economic efficiency on the one hand 
and protection of minority rights on the other. From an efficiency perspec-
tive, a “misery loves company” approach seems irrational. Why invade more 
people’s rights when the government can accomplish its objectives by invad-
ing the rights of fewer people? But from a representation reinforcement per-
spective, insisting on broader coverage makes good sense. As Ely expressly 
recognized, tying the interests of the minority to those of the majority is a 
good way to reinforce representation.302 If the government is willing to dis-
advantage a broader group, we have some assurance that it is acting for a le-
gitimate, public-regarding reason and that the regulation is not simply the 
product of the systematic devaluation of the welfare of an unpopular minori-
ty.
Other outer band cases, not rooted in Ely’s particular ideas about preju-
dice, are nonetheless explicable in terms of the more general aim of making 
the political branches democratically accountable. Consider, for example, the 
prohibition on federal government commandeering of state institutions. The 
Supreme Court has explicitly justified the prohibition on the ground that it 
encourages political accountability. When the federal government requires 
the states to do its dirty work, voters are left confused as to who is responsi-
ble for unpopular policies. On this theory an anticommandeering principle 
reinforces representation by preventing the federal government from evad-
ing responsibility for its actions.303
Opponents of the ACA can make a similar point about the distinction 
between an individual mandate enforced by a tax and a government-run 
health system enforced by a penalty. True, a complete government takeover 
of healthcare is more invasive of the private sphere, especially when people 
are penalized and not merely taxed for noncompliance. But for just that rea-
son, it is also more politically transparent and therefore more likely to gener-
ate political opposition.304 On representation reinforcement grounds, one 
might think that constitutional constraint is less necessary when the gov-
ernment acts more decisively and clearly.
* * *
302. See Ely, Democracy and Distrust, supra note 298, at 83.
303. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992) (“[W]here the Federal Gov-
ernment directs the States to regulate, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public 
disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain insu-
lated from the electoral ramifications of their decision.”).
304. Cf. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 583 n.14 (2012) (opinion of 
Roberts, C.J.) (responding to Justice Ginsburg’s claim that spending problem with Affordable 
Care Act would evaporate if Congress ritualistically reenacted Medicaid with the extension by 
noting that “it would certainly not be that easy. Practical constraints would plainly inhibit, if 
not preclude, the Federal Government from repealing the existing program and putting every 
feature of Medicaid on the table for political reconsideration”).
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The various explanations and justifications offered above suggest that 
the outer band is an optical illusion. It is true that the Constitution some-
times seems less constraining when the government does more rather than 
less. But all of the examples can be traced to a variety of disparate concerns 
that have nothing to do with the broader problem of state action.
IV. Explanations and Justifications: Reintegration
In this Part, I resist the conclusion that these disparate concerns have 
nothing to do with the broader problem of state action. It is important to 
understand, however, that resistance is not the same thing as outright rejec-
tion. All constitutional theorizing is reductionist, and the theory that I offer 
here is no different. Constitutional law is an immensely complex social phe-
nomenon created by an indeterminate mix of doctrinal and textual path de-
pendence; cultural, economic, historical, and political forces; and the ran-
dom eccentricities of Supreme Court justices and other constitutional actors. 
No theory—including theories based on representation reinforcement, polit-
ical benchmarks, systemic-purpose analysis, or protection of dignity that I 
discuss in the previous Part—can capture all of that.305
305. Theories based on representation reinforcement, political benchmarks, systemic-
purpose analysis, or protection of dignity are all prescriptive. They are exercises in justification. 
See David A. Strauss, What Is Constitutional Theory?, 87 Calif. L. Rev. 581, 582 (1999) (argu-
ing that constitutional theory is “an effort to justify a set of prescriptions about how certain
controversial constitutional issues should be decided”). On the difficulties of prescriptive con-
stitutional theory, see Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1
(1998). On the necessity for such theories, see Louis Michael Seidman, Our Unsettled 
Constitution: A New Defense of Constitutionalism and Judicial Review 3–6 (2001), 
arguing that Posner’s supposedly atheoretical pragmatism is itself a theory, and Richard H. 
Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 Calif. L. Rev. 535, 539 (1999) (
“[Q]uestions of constitutional theory are not optional; they cannot be put off as merely aca-
demic pre-occupations, which have no necessary role in the work of judges and lawyers.”). In 
contrast, the theory that I offer here is descriptive. See supra Introduction. It claims to organize 
and explain data that otherwise might be puzzling, but it makes no claim that the organization 
and explanation justifies the outcomes that judges reach.
By advancing such a theory, I necessarily reject David Strauss’s assertion that if a theory 
does not “say something about how to approach controversial issues . . . . there is little point in 
constructing [it].” Strauss, supra, at 584. Explanation can be valuable for its own sake. Moreo-
ver, a clear understanding of how a system actually operates can lay the necessary groundwork 
for developing a prescriptive theory. See supra Introduction.
Still, it is wrong to overstate the distinction between prescription and description. See
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 
Harv. L. Rev. 1189, 1192 (1987) (rejecting a sharp distinction between descriptive and norma-
tive theories). On the one hand, prescriptive theories are of little value if they are completely 
disconnected from existing practice. See Strauss, supra, at 584 (arguing that a prescriptive theo-
ry “cannot contradict any of the points of agreement within the legal culture that are absolutely 
rock solid”). Moreover, a prescriptive theory may be necessary to interpret and organize data 
that is conflicting and ambiguous. For a famous, book-length argument along these lines, see 
Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1986). On the other hand, a thick description of a practice 
may gain prescriptive force for those who are operating within the practice. For an argument 
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If theorizing is to be defended, its ambitions must be more modest. The 
claim that I make for the unifying theory I advance in this Article is that it
provides an illuminating and aesthetically pleasing way of organizing the raw 
material. To meet these ends, it must be consistent with most of that materi-
al, but it need not be consistent with all of it and need not be the only way 
that the material can be organized. Nor need it be “true,” in the sense that it 
explains all the actual motivations of actors who create constitutional law. 
Instead, it must show us something about the subject that is not otherwise 
apparent, make plausible connections between areas of the law that other-
wise seem disparate, and explain outcomes that otherwise seem mysterious. 
If a theory does this much, then it pays for its oversimplifications in the coin 
of elucidation. That is my claim for the theory I advance here.
With these caveats in mind, this Part offers a way of reintegrating the 
disparate strands of explanation outlined in Part III around themes ground-
ed in the state action dilemma. I have two strategies for doing so. The first 
involves confession and avoidance. Suppose that, when taken separately, 
none of the explanations offered in Part III directly relates to the state action 
problem. I argue that when taken together, they nonetheless tell us some-
thing important about that problem. The second strategy resists the premise 
that the explanations are unrelated to state action. Here, I argue that each of 
them is connected with the special problems produced by the disappearance 
of a naturalized boundary between a public and private sphere and the corre-
sponding creation of the mixed middle band of government regulation.
A. Arguments from the Number of Examples
The first strategy relies in part on the sheer number of examples drawn 
from a wide variety of different doctrinal domains. Readers may reject some 
of the specific examples. For example, not everyone will agree with me that 
the government acts more aggressively when it searches an individual than 
when it subpoenas him306 or that executing more white people leaves mi-
nority victims of the death penalty no better off.307 Still, the large number of 
examples leaves room for error.
in favor of our constitutional practices in this spirit, see Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional 
Fate: Theory of the Constitution (1982). But my aims are different from those of Bobbitt 
and Dworkin. Although their ambition is to utilize description in the service of prescription 
(Bobbitt) or prescription in the service of description (Dworkin), mine is to use description in 
the service of deconstruction. See generally Louis Michael Seidman, The Secret History of Amer-
ican Constitutional Skepticism: A Recovery and Preliminary Evaluation, 17 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1
(2014).
306. See supra Section II.D.
307. Cf. Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A Gen-
eral Restatement, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1503, 1534 (2000) (“The Court has struck down laws ex-
pressing contemptuous, hostile, and divisive attitudes simply for their expressive content, 
without requiring any demonstration of adverse causal consequences.”); Jeffrey S. Helmreich, 
Putting Down: Expressive Subordination and Equal Protection, 59 UCLA L. Rev. Discourse 
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Moreover, even if every one of the examples is explained by exogenous 
text, doctrine, or policy concerns, the number still tells us something im-
portant about the conventional state action story. That story makes protec-
tion of a private sphere from government intervention central to constitu-
tional law. The dichotomous view equates “no state action” with “no 
constitutional violation” because state action is what the Constitution pro-
tects against.308 But in many cases, arguments for limited government take a 
back seat to other concerns like the protection of a particular conception of 
dignity, the establishment of political benchmarks, the protection of minori-
ties, or the avoidance of various forms of systemic malfunction. The mere 
existence of so many cases where the Constitution leaves the government 
less constrained when it acts more intrusively suggests that the standard sto-
ry is too simple. At a minimum, the cases demonstrate that the Constitution
balances multiple concerns, that constraint of government is only one of 
them, and that that concern is frequently outweighed by others.
B. Arguments from the Mixing of Public and Private
All this assumes that the text, doctrines, and policy concerns are unrelat-
ed to the state action problem. But they are not. Here, my second strategy 
takes hold. In complex and not-always-obvious ways, each of the explana-
tions I advance in the previous Part grows out of the special problem that the 
mixed, regulatory band has created. Briefly stated, the problem is associated 
with what classical republicans referred to as “corruption”—the intermixing 
of the private with the public.309 On this view, the problem is not just the 
classical liberal concern that the public will dominate the private, thereby in-
vading human freedom, but also the risk that public institutions will be cap-
tured by private interests, thereby undermining the public interest.
The pre–New Deal solution to this problem was to bound separate pri-
vate and public spheres. Famously, beginning in the late nineteenth century, 
the Supreme Court protected a private sphere of market and, to some degree, 
personal freedom.310 Less famously, it resisted “class legislation” thought to 
promote the welfare of special interests rather than the public as a whole.311
112, 118 (2012) (“[A] government action can subordinate people because of their race or eth-
nic community without inflicting any tangible harm.”).
308. See supra Introduction, Section I.A.
309. See, e.g., Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, supra note 94, at 32 (de-
scribing republican fear that if “corruption occurs, groups seeking to use government power to 
promote their own private ends might come to dominate the political process”).
310. For a defense of Lochner that emphasizes the association between market and civil 
liberties, see Bernstein, supra note 76.
311. See Howard Gilman, The Constitution Besieged (1993); cf. Barry Cushman, 
Some Varieties and Vicissitudes in Lochnerism, 85 B.U. L. Rev. 881 (2005) (arguing that “neu-
trality” view of Lochner has considerable explanatory power, but that no single theory explains 
all the cases).
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The two concerns were complementary in the sense that class legislation, 
outside the police power, invaded private rights for no good public reason.312
The justificatory rationale that supported this structure depended on the 
rule-like bright line that separated the public from the private. The point of 
late nineteenth-century jurisprudence was not that the Constitution de-
manded a night watchman state or that that it “enact[ed] Mr. Herbert Spen-
cer’s Social Statics.”313 As many constitutional historians have pointed out, 
the Lochner-era Court often upheld regulatory legislation.314 Instead, the 
point was that the two bands were closed categories, separated by a clearly 
demarcated, judicially enforced, constitutional boundary.315
The Court was deeply suspicious of efforts to use analogical reasoning to 
break down this barrier. Regulation of the hours worked by miners was with-
in the police power, but regulation of the hours worked by bakers was not.316
When critics of the Court pointed to the arbitrariness of this boundary,317
they missed the point. All formal distinctions are arbitrary, but that fact 
alone does not defeat the main argument for formalism. Recognizing a claim 
that bakers were “like” miners because both professions were dangerous 
312. On the other hand, the two concerns might lead to divergent results regarding the 
existence of a separate outer band of state freedom. Gilman gives the following example: if a 
statute prohibits employers from docking the wages of an employee for taking time to vote, it 
might be treated as invalid class legislation that takes from A and gives to B in an unprincipled 
fashion. Suppose, though, that the legislature instead enacted a statute that closed all commer-
cial entities on election day. From the “class” point of view, the statute might be considered 
more acceptable because the law is of general applicability, while from the public/private point 
of view, it might be more objectionable because it constrains more private behavior. See Gil-
man, supra note 311, at 93–94. This difference, in turn, suggests that the “class” interpretation 
makes pre–New Deal reasoning more consistent with modern thought.
313. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting), abrogated by
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
314. See, e.g., David E. Bernstein, Lochner’s Legacy’s Legacy, 82 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 35 (2003) 
(noting that with “a few famous exceptions,” the Lochner Court upheld “regulatory laws that 
had real or potential redistributive consequences”).
315. The point is neatly illustrated by Ernst Freund’s monumental treatise on the police 
power. See Ernst Freund, The Police Power: Public Policy and Constitutional Rights 
(1904). More than some of his judicial contemporaries, Freund was prepared to recognize that 
“the police power must continue to be elastic, [i.e.,] capable of development.” Id. at 3. Yet the 
very nature of his project reveals a faith in the ability to systematize, classify, and differentiate 
between purported exercises of the power. With obsessive detail, his eight hundred-page vol-
ume purports to accomplish that task.
316. The Lochner Court recognized that the nature of mining was “such as to make it 
reasonable and proper for the State to interfere to prevent the employés [sic] from being con-
strained by the rules laid down by the proprietors in regard to labor.” 198 U.S. at 54. But analo-
gies to these and other cases where regulation was upheld had to be rejected because “[i]t 
must . . . be conceded that there is a limit to the valid exercise of the police power by the State.”
Id. at 56.
317. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 Yale L.J. 454, 457–58, 479–81 (1909) 
(accusing Lochner majority of “mechanical” application of rules).
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risked the erasure of a clear boundary and, hence, the slow but inevitable ex-
pansion of government power into every phase of American life.318
The critics of formalism prevailed, at least partially. In a modern setting, 
this separate spheres approach is therefore anomalous. Of course, constitu-
tional law is still filled with formal rules like the tiers of scrutiny in equal 
protection cases or the presumption against content-based speech regula-
tion. But few modern judges believe that there is a comprehensive system of 
judicially enforceable rules that rigidly separates a public and private sphere. 
The result is that our polity is littered with public–private partnerships,319
negotiated rulemaking,320 outsourcing of public functions,321 semipublic in-
stitutions,322 and soft regulation that influences rather than commands pri-
vate choice so as to achieve public objectives.323
This blurring of the line between public and private is far from unprece-
dented.324 Concern about “corruption” of the public by the private originates 
with the birth of the country.325 Nineteenth-century American governments 
“often blended the boundaries between the public and private spheres, grant-
318. As the Lochner Court put the point, the analogy had to be resisted because other-
wise:
A printer, a tinsmith, a locksmith, a carpenter, a cabinetmaker, a dry goods clerk, a 
bank’s, a lawyer’s, or a physician’s clerk, or a clerk in almost any kind of business, 
would all come under the power of the legislature . . . . No trade, no occupation, no 
mode of earning one’s living, could escape this all-pervading power, and the acts of the 
legislature in limiting the hours of labor in all employments would be valid . . . .
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 59.
319. See, e.g., Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of 
the United States 54 (2d ed. 1979) (noting the “ethical and conceptual mingling of the no-
tion of organized private groups with the notions of local government and self-government”
and the fact that “direct interest-group participation in government became synonymous with 
self-government”).
320. See Negotiated Rulemaking Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561–70 (2012). Compare Cary 
Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 
Duke L.J. 1255 (1997) (criticizing negotiated rulemaking), with Philip J. Harter, Assessing the 
Assessors: The Actual Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 9 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 32 (2000) 
(defending negotiated rulemaking).
321. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New 
Religion, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1229 (2003); Alexander Volokh, The New Private-Regulation Skep-
ticism: Due Process, Non-Delegation, and Antitrust Challenges, 37 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 931
(2014).
322. See Lowi, supra note 319, at 67–91 (describing mixture of public and private in De-
partments of Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor).
323. See generally Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Deci-
sions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness (2008).
324. See Minow, supra note 321 at 1237 (“During the nineteenth century, federal, state, 
and local governments used land grants, tax exemptions, and corporate and antitrust law to 
stimulate private efforts in the service of public aims.”).
325. See, e.g., Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic: 1776-1787,
at 54–65 (1998).
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ing public powers to private individuals”326 and opposition to this blending 
has played an important role in outsider critique throughout our history.327
It formed the backdrop for fierce political struggles, like the titanic battle 
over the Second Bank of the United States, which was fought largely because 
the Bank’s opponents objected to private control over what they thought 
should be a public institution.328 Andrew Jackson’s famous veto message in-
veighed against “all new grants of monopolies and exclusive privileges, 
against any prostitution of our Government to the advancement of the few at 
the expense of the many.”329 Still the very fact that the Bank was so contro-
versial and was ultimately destroyed demonstrates how our political culture 
has changed. Today, public–private partnerships and cooperation are the 
norm rather than the exception. Instead of the source of political contesta-
tion, they are the way that business is done.330
Not surprisingly, this shift has produced a change in constitutional ju-
risprudence. It remains true that when decisionmaking is perceived to be ful-
ly public or fully private, constitutional constraints are not required. These 
spheres form the outer and inner bands of modern state action rules. But the 
primary purpose of constitutional law is no longer to enforce supposedly 
impermeable boundaries between these bands. Instead, much of constitu-
tional law now consists of correcting pathologies associated with the vast 
middle band. These strategies must at once recognize and legitimate the 
blending of public and private and ward off the evils once addressed by the 
insistence on separate spheres. Each of the theories discussed in the previous 
part is designed to achieve these objectives.
1. Dignity. Consider first the version of dignity at stake when the gov-
ernment forces a defendant to incriminate herself, bribes people to abandon 
their religious convictions, or commandeers state officials. Of course, the 
Self-Incrimination Clause long predates the New Deal revolution; concern 
for dignity is hardly a twentieth-century invention. But Fifth Amendment 
doctrine produced by the intersection of self-incrimination and the regulato-
ry state is a new development.331 Although there are a few pre–New Deal an-
tecedents of modern unconstitutional condition and anticommandeering 
326. Thomas Goebel, The Political Economy of American Populism from Jackson to the 
New Deal, 11 Stud. Am. Pol. Dev. 109, 115 (1997).
327. See, e.g., id. at 110–12.
328. For an account, see Robert V. Remini, Andrew Jackson 163–98 (1999).
329. See President Jackson’s Veto Message Regarding the Bank of the United States: July 10, 
1832, Yale L. Sch.: Avalon Project, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/ajveto01.asp
[https://perma.cc/2MZ3-CWY4].
330. Cf. Minow, supra note 321, at 1241 (“[D]espite striking continuities, the new privati-
zation marks important departures and generates strong objections.”).
331. For an account of how criminal procedure decisions at the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury had roots in Lochner-like assumptions, see William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of 
Criminal Procedure, 105 Yale L.J. 393, 420–33 (1995).
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doctrine,332 these problems have taken on special importance because of the 
emergence of the middle band.
There are two interlocking reasons why dignity sometimes replaces 
freedom as a focus of concern in this setting. First, the traditional role of 
freedom in justifying the separation between spheres has lost some of its 
force in the modern era. The problem can be traced to early Legal Realist cri-
tiques of the old order. Recall that that order was premised on the existence 
of two separate spheres with freedom associated with one sphere and coer-
cion with the other. Workers were “free” when government did not regulate 
their wages and hours, but they were coerced when legislatures intervened by 
enacting wage and hour legislation.333 State governments were “free” to se-
lect their own policies when the federal government did nothing, but they 
were coerced by federal preemption.334 Constitutional law consisted of ef-
forts to prevent incursions by the public sphere of coercion into the private 
sphere of freedom.
Legal Realists systematically attacked this association. They argued that 
workers did not freely enter contracts that made them work long hours or 
prohibited them from joining unions.335 Instead, these agreements were co-
erced by market conditions that left workers defenseless against private ex-
ploitation.336 Similarly, when the Supreme Court eventually upheld federal 
power to enact national social-welfare programs, it did so by rejecting the 
view that states were acting freely when the federal government failed to act. 
Just as workers were “coerced” by competition from fellow workers into ac-
cepting substandard working conditions, so too, states were coerced by in-
terstate competition into failing to enact measures that they otherwise would 
have preferred.337
Arguments like these provided a key justification for creation of the 
middle band of regulation. Because freedom was not a necessary feature of 
the private sphere, the standard arguments for constitutional protections 
332. On anticommandeering, see Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842), 
holding that Congress had exclusive power to assist slave owners in securing the return of state 
slaves and striking down state regulations of the means by which slaves were delivered up. On 
unconstitutional conditions, see Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R. Commission, 271 U.S. 583 
(1926), invalidating state law that allowed companies to use public highways only if they re-
ceived certificate certifying that business was for the “public convenience and necessity.”
333. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), abrogated by Ferguson v. Skrupa, 
372 U.S. 726 (1963).
334. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
335. For classic early realist texts making this point, see, for example, Morris R. Cohen, 
Property and Sovereignty, 13 Cornell L.Q. 8 (1927), and Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distri-
bution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, supra note 6.
336. See supra note 335.
337. See Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 588 (1937) (“But if states had been 
holding back before the passage of the federal law, inaction was not owing, for the most part, to 
the lack of sympathetic interest. Many held back through alarm lest, in laying such a toll upon 
their industries, they would place themselves in a position of economic disadvantage as com-
pared with neighbors or competitors.”).
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against public encroachment lost much of their force. The result might have 
been the triumph of socialism in the form of a complete government takeo-
ver. The actual result, though, was the emergence of a mixed middle band 
where private property and market outcomes coexisted with various forms 
of government regulation.
But it does not follow that there are no pathologies requiring constitu-
tional correction within this band. The second reason for dignity’s emer-
gence is that it corresponds to anxieties especially associated with the middle 
band. Even as older versions of freedom become less plausible, modern wor-
ries about dignity become more pressing. Dignity is all that remains when 
freedom loses its meaning.
If the government had totally displaced private conduct, freedom might 
have remained a relevant ground for critique, but that is not how the gov-
ernment typically behaves in middle band cases. Instead, it often operates 
through a complex and opaque system of bribes, nudges, incentives, and 
conditions.338 Instead of displacing choice, government corrupts it. The risk 
is that the modern regime “helps create the sense that power need not be 
power at all, control need not be control, and government need not be coer-
cive.”339 People use their “freedom” to make choices that they regret or that 
they do not even recognize as their own. They become alienated from their 
own commitments and values. So long as constitutional law was conceptual-
ized as creating two entirely separate bands and preventing the infiltration of 
one by the other, this problem does not arise. It becomes a pressing concern 
only when freedom no longer does the work of keeping the bands separate 
and a mixed middle band emerges.
2. Political benchmarks, systemic purpose, and representation reinforce-
ment. Just as protection of dignity is part of the substantive architecture of 
tripartite constitutionalism, the articulation of political benchmarks, concern 
about systemic purpose, and representation reinforcement are important 
components of the procedural architecture. As explained below, these modes 
of constitutional thought all respond to the erosion of naturalized bounda-
ries that produced the middle band in the first place.
Pre–New Deal constitutionalism often assumed that one could deduce 
principles about the limits of government from uncontroversial postulates 
about freedom, consent, and individualism. New Deal constitutionalism 
complicated these assumptions. It opened space for regulatory and redistrib-
utive legislation by arguing that the location of the boundary between public 
and private amounted to a political choice and that labels like “free” and “in-
dividual” get attached only after the choice is made on political grounds.
The realization that background state action that constituted markets 
was politically chosen rather than natural opened up space for discretionary 
legislative decisions about the appropriate scope of government intervention. 
338. See supra notes 319–323 and accompanying text.
339. Lowi, supra note 319, at 55.
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As outlined in Part II, however, this shift produced a serious dilemma for 
conventional state action analysis. On the one hand, it seems contradictory 
for the Court to treat background state action as natural in the judicial 
sphere even as it recognizes its discretionary character in the legislative 
sphere. On the other hand, a full embrace of its discretionary character in the 
judicial sphere would constitutionalize everything by recognizing that all 
private action results from government choice.340
The procedural architecture of tripartite constitutionalism offers a solu-
tion to this dilemma. It provides standards that guide and limit judicial in-
tervention without relying on Lochner-like assumptions about natural 
boundaries protecting the private domain. When the Court holds the politi-
cal branches to benchmarks that those branches themselves have established, 
it is not insisting that the benchmarks are immutable or constitutionally 
compelled. For example, if a legislature wants to overcome an equal protec-
tion objection, it can change the benchmark by applying the statutory 
scheme to more people.341
Similarly, systemic-purpose review permits the political branches to pur-
sue the policies they prefer and to limit individual freedom when they do so. 
Individual flag burners and sound truck operators may have fewer speech 
opportunities when the government regulates public fires and noise, but they 
have no valid constitutional claim. The Court can respect the discretionary 
political nature of regulatory decisions while still maintaining a role for itself 
if it polices the decisions only for unconstitutional purpose.
Finally, representation reinforcement promises a role for the courts that 
legitimates rather than undermines discretionary regulatory decisions. In a 
world where there are natural limits on government power, the legitimacy of 
legislative decisions rests on whether the decisions accurately track those 
limits. But this is not our world. In the absence of an impermeable, natural-
ized boundary between public and private, we require a different source of 
legitimation. Ely saw that the democratic character of political decisions 
could do the trick while also providing a new role for judges.342 Just because 
the legislature in our world has legitimate authority to decide when and 
where to regulate, the courts must be vigilant to ensure that the decisions are 
made democratically.
* * *
I hope these observations are sufficient to demonstrate that the proce-
dural and substantive techniques I have outlined above are closely tied to the 
emergence of middle band constitutionalism. To complete the argument, 
one final point must be emphasized: each of these techniques necessarily 
means that sometimes the government will be less constitutionally con-
340. See supra Section I.B.
341. See supra Section II.E.
342. See supra note 298.
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strained when it acts more aggressively. A preference for dignity over free-
dom means that some policies that give people more choices are more con-
stitutionally vulnerable. Politically alterable benchmarks mean that the gov-
ernment can avoid constitutional constraints by changing the benchmark to 
restrict the freedoms of more people. Concern about systemic purpose 
means that individual rights claims take a back seat to cleansing the political 
process. Representation reinforcement means that government intervention 
is less problematic when majorities as well as minorities are constrained by 
it.
To generalize the point: conventional dichotomous state action analysis 
fails to take account of the ways in which expansion of government power 
can free the government from constitutional constraints. That blindness, in 
turn, stems from a failure to fully comprehend the emergence of a middle, 
mixed band of government regulation and the pathologies that the middle 
band is thought to create.
Conclusion
When asked about the political philosophy that underlay the new Ten-
nessee Valley Authority, Franklin Roosevelt replied that it was “neither fish 
nor fowl.”343 His quip characterizes the New Deal as a whole and the theoret-
ical problems it left in its wake. Neither socialist nor capitalist, the New Deal 
produced a mixed economy with pervasive entanglement of public and pri-
vate. With this new order came well-known worries about private, special-
interest capture of the public and overbearing public domination of the pri-
vate.
The ambition of New Deal constitutionalism is to domesticate the inevi-
table problems that result from this messy, atheoretical compromise. Do-
mains that are perceived to be fully public or fully private do not present 
these problems—or at least the problems are not so obvious. New Deal con-
stitutionalism finds its home in the middle band that the New Deal itself cre-
ated, where constitutionalism’s constraining, legitimating, and sorting func-
tions are most required.
In this conclusion, I offer some brief thoughts about whether this theo-
retical structure is stable. There are two kinds of risks. The first risk was the 
subject of Part II: survival of private rights in a publicly constituted sphere 
rests on a myth that New Deal constitutionalism itself destroyed. Because the 
boundary between public and private inevitably results from public deci-
sions, the state can be seen as responsible for all private decisions. New Deal 
thinking might therefore lead to the constitutionalization of the entire social 
sphere.344 The risk, in other words, is that the middle band will subsume the 
343. H.W. Brands, Traitor to His Class: The Privileged Life and Radical Presi-
dency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt 338 (2008).
344. See supra Section I.B.
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inner band and leave no room for a private realm free of constitutional dis-
cipline. This is the problem that the conventional modern state action doc-
trine was meant to solve. It attempted to preserve a limit on judicial expan-
sion into the private sphere even as the barriers to legislative expansion 
eroded. By now, the contradictions, incoherence, and ineffectiveness of this 
solution are well understood.345
But there is also a second risk that has received less attention. Once we 
realize that there is also an outer band free of constitutional constraint, then 
the publicly constructed boundary between the outer and middle bands is 
also vulnerable. We need to worry that outer band thinking will result in the 
deconstitutionalization of the entire social sphere.
This second risk also derives from the perception that the dividing line 
between public and private is constructed, political, and contingent. Natural-
ized, nondiscretionary boundaries seem permanent and impermeable. Con-
structed boundaries are delicate and porous. If the sovereign can escape con-
stitutional obligation in one domain, then why not in another? Sovereign 
powers may be separated between the political and judicial branches, but, 
when push comes to shove, it will still be a public entity that chooses wheth-
er to enforce constitutional limits against another public entity. The judici-
ary and the political branches are both public, and, if they form an alliance, 
there is nothing stopping them from marching around the phony Maginot 
Line that defends the middle band from outer band incursions.
There is plenty of evidence that push sometimes does come to shove. In 
addition to the outer band cases discussed above, we have legal rules like 
sovereign and qualified immunity,346 the state secret privilege,347 the politi-
cal-question doctrine,348 and justiciability requirements349 that shield the 
sovereign from constitutional criticism when the need is great enough.350
345. See supra Part I.
346. See, e.g., Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017) (plurality opinion in part) (qualified 
immunity); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (sovereign immunity). For 
critiques, see William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 Calif. L. Rev 45 (2018), 
on qualified immunity, and Pamela S. Karlan, Lecture, Disarming the Private Attorney General,
2003 U. Ill. L. Rev. 183, 188–95, on sovereign immunity.
347. For the humble origins of the privilege, see United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 
(1953). For an account of its metastatic spread, see Laura K. Donohue, The Shadow of State 
Secrets, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 77 (2010).
348. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (plurality opinion); Nixon v. United 
States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993). For an analysis, see Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? 
The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 Colum. L. 
Rev. 237 (2002), and Louis Michael Seidman, The Secret Life of the Political Question Doctrine,
37 J. Marshall L. Rev. 441 (2004).
349. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (standing); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 
U.S. 312 (1974) (mootness); Laird v. Tatum, 405 U.S. 1 (1972) (ripeness).
350. See generally Aziz Z. Huq, Judicial Independence and the Rationing of Constitutional 
Remedies, 65 Duke L.J. 1 (2015) (arguing that limiting of constitutional remedies is associated 
with judicial independence); Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration,
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And beyond the legal rules, we have the irrepressible possibility of sheer con-
stitutional disobedience. We have Franklin Roosevelt’s threat in his first in-
augural address to employ extraordinary measures351 and his internment of 
thousands of American citizens of Japanese descent.352 We have the impris-
onment of the leaders of the Communist party during the Red Scare353 and 
the post-9/11 torture and warrantless surveillance programs.354 In short, our 
constitutional system that protects individuals from government is delicate 
and subject to both legal and sociopolitical pressures.
It would be hyperbolic to suggest that these imperialistic invasions 
staged from outer band territory have conquered the middle band. There are 
plenty of instances where the government permits a mixed system to func-
tion and where constitutional rules govern the interaction. But I hope I have 
said enough to suggest that it is not constitutional theory that keeps the 
middle band intact. Once the idea of naturalized public and private domains 
has been destroyed, there is no reason in theory why the outer band cannot 
take over the middle or the middle take over the inner band. The contradic-
tions inherent in New Deal constitutionalism are too blatant and obvious for 
it to do the work required of it.
So why does the middle band survive? After noting that the Tennessee 
Valley authority was “neither fish nor fowl,” Franklin Roosevelt went on to 
observe that “whatever it is, it will taste awfully good to the people of the 
Tennessee Valley.”355 Roosevelt was famously pragmatic and resistant to 
theoretical abstraction.356 As his comment suggests, he understood the pow-
er of material prosperity, shared values, and a sense of common purpose to 
overcome theoretical contradiction. That understanding, in turn, reflects an 
important strain in American Progressive thought articulated most forceful-
99 Colum. L. Rev. 857 (1999) (arguing that the distinction between substantive rights and 
remedies is artificial).
351. See President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1933), in
Franklin Delano Roosevelt: First Inaugural Address, American Rhetoric (Feb. 25, 2017), 
http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/fdrfirstinaugural.html [https://perma.cc/3BH4-
74YF]. (“But, in the event that the Congress shall fail to take one of these two courses, in the 
event that the national emergency is still critical, I shall not evade the clear course of duty that 
will then confront me.”).
352. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding exclusion order),
abrogated by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
353. For an account, see Geoffrey R. Stone, Perilous Times: Free Speech in War-
time from the Sedition Act of 1798 to the War on Terrorism 393–426 (2004).
354. For a book-length critique, see Frederick A.O. Schwarz Jr. & Aziz Z. Huq, Un-
checked and Unbalanced: Presidential Power in a Time of Terror (2007).
355. Brands, supra note 343, at 338.
356. See, e.g., James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and The Fox 156
(1956) (“Everything conspired in 1932 to make Roosevelt a pragmatist, an opportunist, an ex-
perimenter.”).
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ly in earlier years by figures like John Dewey357 and Oliver Wendell 
Holmes.358 As Holmes put it: “The life of the law has not been logic: it has 
been experience.”359
For now, then, the contradictions in constitutional theory hardly matter. 
The contradictions provide tools for libertarian scholars on the right and 
critical scholars on the left who want to dismantle the current constitutional 
order. But for ordinary Americans, our messy mixed system surrounded by 
ill-defined inner and outer bands “taste[s] awfully good.”
Still, it is hard to escape the sense that the culture of compromise, toler-
ance, and restraint that has made the system work is beginning to fray and 
that the material prosperity that promotes that culture is slipping away. Will 
the middle band hold in this environment? Perhaps it will, but one thing is 
certain: no one should expect middle band constitutional theory to save us 
from the coming attack.
357. On Dewey’s relativist theory of democracy, see Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Cri-
sis of Democratic Theory: Scientific Naturalism & the Problem of Value 200–07 
(1973).
358. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 1 (Chicago, Am. Bar Ass’n
2009) (1881).
359. Id.
